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THE JURIDICAL STRUCTURE OF HABITUAL




H ABITUAL offender laws, which are centered on the idea of "enhancing"
criminal punishment based on an offender's earlier crimes, have long
been an important component of American sentencing policy. These laws
became more prominent over the last couple of decades, with almost every state,
as well as the federal government, either adopting some new, more punitive
habitual offender laws, or reinforcing their existing regime. This resurgent trend
in the use of habitual offender laws culminated in the 1990s, when a number of
states rushed to adopt "three strikes" laws.'
Despite being entrenched in sentencing policy, habitual offender laws have
recently generated considerable controversy. Much of this controversy was
likely inspired by accounts of these laws resulting in grossly disproportionate
sentences, 2 and perhaps also by increasing unease over harsh sentencing in an era
of high incarceration rates and fiscal strain. Contemporary legal scholars'
hostility toward habitual offender laws has expressed itself in several ways.
First, these laws have been charged with imposing enormous human costs in
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado-Boulder School of Law; J.D. Yale
Law School, 1994. I am grateful to professors Kevin Reitz, Pierre Schlag, and John V. White for
providing me with insights that proved very helpful in developing this article and to David Lipka
and Stephanie Zehren-Thomas for outstanding research assistance. I also derived considerable
benefit from an opportunity to present a draft of this article to the faculty of Rutgers School of
Law-Newark.
1. On the long history of habitual offender laws in the United States, see generally V.F.
Nourse, Rethinking Crime Legislation: History and Harshness, 39 TULSA L. REV. 925, app. A at
930-32 (2004); Michael G. Turner et al., "Three Strikes and You're Out" Legislation: A National
Assessment, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1995, at 16, 17; Daniel Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A
Reconsideration, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 99, 99-104 (1972). On the more recent proliferation of three
strikes laws and their tendency to expand or replace existing habitual offender laws, see JOHN
CLARK ET AL., "THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT": A REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION 1-14 (1997).
2. Two recent and well publicized U.S. Supreme Court cases expose this feature of habitual
offender laws. In Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 17-20 (2003), a defendant was sentenced to 25
years to life for stealing about $1,200 worth of golf clubs; in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66-
68 (2003), the defendant was sentenced to life for stealing less than $200 worth of video tapes. See
also Timothy Egan, War on Crack Retreats Still Taking Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1999 at 1;
3 Strikes Upheld in Coffee Theft, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 22, 2000, at A3.
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excessively lengthy sentences, sometimes for the most trivial crimes, in return for
little demonstrated gain in moral retribution3 or public safety.4 Second, they have
been criticized for their prodigious consumption of criminal justice resources-
again, for little proven gain. Third, they have been cited for their apparent
violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, and the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses
of the Constitution.6 These arguments have done little to stem the proliferation
of habitual offender laws or to influence the courts, which have recently
reconsidered such statutes only to reaffirm their constitutionality.7 However, this
literature has raised important questions about the legal foundations of habitual
offender laws as well as their ultimate value as criminal justice policy.
3. On the uncertain fidelity of habitual offender laws to traditional notions of retribution-a
position that typically stresses the lack of proportionality between habitual offender sentencing and
the moral culpability of the relevant offenses-see, e.g., Michael Vitiello, California's Three
Strikes and We're Out: Was Judicial Activism California's Best Hope?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1025, 1071-81 (2004); George Fletcher, The Recidivist Premium, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer-Fall
1982, at 54, 57-59; Daniel Roger, Note, People v. Fuhrman and Three Strikes: Have The
Traditional Goals of Recidivist Sentencing Been Sacrificed at the Altar of Public Passion, 20 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 139, 149-62 (1998).
4. On the uncertain ability of these laws to advance utilitarian goals, see, e.g., FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF
CRIME 100-27 (1995);Vitiello, supra note 3, at 1081-96; Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody,
The Lethal Effects of Three-Strikes Laws, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 89, 89-98, 108 (2001) (highlighting
perverse incentives of habitual offender laws); Mike Males & Dan Macallair, Striking Out: The
Failure of California's "Three Strikes and You're Out" Law, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 65, 66-72
(1999); Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Do Three Strikes Laws Make Sense? Habitual
Offender Statutes and Criminal Incapacitation, 87 GEO. L.J. 103, 110-38 (1998) [hereinafter Beres
& Griffith, Criminal Incapacitation]; Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Did "Three Strikes"
Cause the Recent Drop in California Crime? An Analysis of the California Attorney General's
Report, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 101, 104-27 (1998) [hereinafter Beres & Griffith, Drop in California
Crime?]. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN CALIFORNIA: THE
IMPACT OF THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT (1999); VINCENT SCHIRLADI ET AL., JUSTICE POL'Y
INST., THREE STRIKES & YOU'RE OuT: AN EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF 3-STRIKES LAW 10
YEARS AFTER THEIR ENACTMENT (2004), available at
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/articles-publications/publications/threestrikes-20040923.
5. See, e.g., Michael Vitiello, Reforming Three Strikes'Excesses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 3-7, 8-
17 (2004); Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 395, 398 (1997); Fox Butterfield, '3 Strikes'Law in California is Clogging Courts
and Jails, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1995, at Al.
6. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Cruel and Unusual: The Story of Leandro Andrade, 52
DRAKE L. REv. 1, 10-24 (2003); Rose A. Coonen, Note, United States v. Gatewood: Does the
Three Strikes Statute Violate Due Process and Undermine the Presumption of Innocence, 29 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 83, 91-112 (2001); L. Allison Heller, Note, Three Strikes, Two Bites at the Apple, and One
Offense?: An Examination of Monge v. California and the Double Jeopardy Clause's
Inapplicability to Three Strikes Law, 77 N.C. L. REv. 2007, 2020-48 (1999); Nathan H. Seltzer,
Note, When the Tail Wags the Dog: The Collision Course Between Recidivism Statutes and the
Double Jeopardy Clause, 83 B.U. L. REv. 921, 928-39 (2003).
7. See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20-31; Lockeyer, 538 U.S. at 71-77; Franklin v. Florida, 887
So.2d 1063, 1082-83 (Fla. 2004) (upholding three-strikes laws against various constitutional
challenges).
[Vol. 37
Spring 2006] HABITUAL OFFENDER LAWS 707
An important shortcoming of the literature on habitual offender laws, however,
is that it makes no real attempt to uncover the juridical implications of these
statutes. Specifically, it does not confront the broader and, in many ways, more
ominous implications of habitual offender laws for the way the state asserts its
sovereignty and, consequently, its prerogatives of social control. 8 This represents
a serious oversight, because habitual offender laws embody disturbingly
authoritarian tendencies that transcend their particular effects in sentencing or
constitutional doctrine, and which are overlooked by the literature whose concern
is confined to these effects. These authoritarian tendencies are rooted in the
juridical structure of habitual offender laws. These laws establish a framework
for intensifying and qualitatively expanding the state's social control functions
relative to marginalized groups-primarily members of the lower classes and
racial minorities-and ultimately advancing a jurisprudence of authoritarian
social control.
These authoritarian tendencies are captured by habitual offender laws'
incompatibility with the rule of law, which is reflected initially in these laws'
double jeopardy and retroactive effects. These effects offend the rule of law on a
fundamental level involving its basis in principles of legality and legal generality.
At the same time that habitual offender laws run afoul of the rule of law on these
bases, these laws also tend to criminalize status. Ironically, this status-based
feature is actually embraced by these laws' political proponents, as well as the
courts, in their attempts to reconcile habitual offender laws' double jeopardy and
retroactive effects with the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses.9 Not
only does this resort to status, which is endorsed uncritically even by opponents
of habitual offender laws, fail to resolve the juridical difficulties created by these
laws' double jeopardy and retroactive effects, but the courts' emphasis on status
exposes a further conflict with the rule of law. Specifically, in their
criminalization of status-which occurs in the guise of sentencing-habitual
offender laws go beyond the usual authority of the state in the criminal justice
context, which has typically been limited to criminalizing particular acts.
Instead, this traditional limit on the state's authority is displaced in favor of a
fundamentally more expansive notion of the limits of criminal culpability and the
power of the state to punish, to coerce, and to dominate. In addition to the
occluded but unresolved problems of double jeopardy and retroactivity, the
emphasis on status is neither an accident nor a simple reflection of a punitive
impulse. In their various affronts to the rule of law, these effects capture the
8. Among the few discussions of the theoretical implications of habitual offender laws is
Markus Dirk Dubber, Recidivist Statutes as Arrational Punishment, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 689 (1995).
Dubber's article considers the way such laws erode the state's claim on a monopoly of legitimate
social violence, flout traditional justifications for criminal punishment, violate liberty interests as
against the state, and diminish the possibilities for rational discourse on criminal justice issues. Id.
at 691-713. It represents a commendable effort to transcend the usual boundaries of the debate and
to broach some broader, juridical concerns about habitual offender laws. Dubber's analysis,
though, is not particularly concerned with these laws' implications for the relationship of the state
to individuals and to civil society, something essential to a thoroughgoing juridical critique.
9. See, e.g., Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400 (1995).
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juridical features by which contemporary habitual offender laws accomplish a
dramatic, authoritarian expansion in the legal boundaries of social control.
In fact, the key virtue of this juridical, rule of law-based critique, and one of its
major advantages over more conventional assessments, is precisely that it
highlights the latent dangers of authoritarianism that inhere in habitual offender
laws. The rule of law is not a politically unproblematic construct, particularly
when it is evaluated from a progressive or leftist perspective. Nevertheless, the
construct describes the legal and political boundaries of authoritarian rule. This
is not to say that any affront to the rule of law, however limited, necessarily
presages the advent of an authoritarian state, or that habitual offender laws
necessarily open the gates to fascism. There are reasons, however, to regard
warily the continued effects of these laws and their legal endorsement by the
courts. The jurisprudence that these laws articulate is authoritarian both in
latently expansive ways, which derive from their jurisprudential and ideological
effects, and manifest, but localized, ways, which involve their immediate effect
on the politically powerless and socially oppressed.
While the rule of law is essential to this critique, not just any rule of law
construct is able to expose the juridical structure of habitual offender laws or to
link this structure to a tendency toward authoritarian social control. In
developing a concept sufficient to this task, this article draws on the work of the
German-American critical theorist, Franz Neumann. 10  Influenced by both
Marxist and liberal theory, Neumann displayed a rare sensitivity to the rule of
law's classical doctrinal formulations, its historicity as both concept and practical
legal norms, its often ambivalent political implications, and the rule of law's
tenuous fate in the evolution of liberal, social democratic, and authoritarian
states.11 Neumann's account of the rule of law, provides a concept that is critical,
but in an un-dogmatic way, and that is sensitive to the rule of law's political
significance without devolving into a legalistic over-statement of the law's
autonomous social significance. Although this article is not a disquisition on
Neumann, it does entail an extensive engagement with his work, as this proves
vital to the overall project.
This article is divided into four main parts. Part II uses Neumann's work to
develop a useful concept of the rule of law. This section demonstrates how the
rule of law proscribes the key juridical features of habitual offender laws,
specifically double jeopardy, retroactivity, and the criminalization of status.
Further drawing on Neumann, this section underscores the rule of law's tenuous
condition in modem society and the specter of authoritarianism-indeed, of
outright fascism-that accompanies its dissolution. Part III first describes the
basic features of habitual offender laws-their essential structures and their
pervasiveness. Then, it shows how these laws have been upheld by the courts
against constitutional challenge. Significantly, it shows how the courts have
deprived the relevant constitutional doctrines of any juridical alignment with rule
10. See, e.g., infra notes 20-37.
11. See generally FRANZ L. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW: POLITICAL THEORY AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM IN MODERN SOCIETY (1986).
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of law norms in order to uphold these statutes. Also, this section shows how the
attempt to evade double jeopardy and ex post facto issues devolves into an
embrace of these laws' basis in status and how this works as a unwitting
confession on the part of the courts of the problematic juridical structure that
inheres in habitual offender laws. Part IV addresses the social control
implications of habitual offender laws. It stresses the qualitatively distinct model
of social control that inheres in the juridical form of habitual offender laws, and
analyzes the authoritarian implications of this. Part V concludes by exploring the
relevance of this critique to the state of the rule of law and social control in
contemporary society.
II. THE RULE OF LAW AND THE LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY
A threshold problem for any juridical critique that draws heavily on the rule of
law is that the construct is so often rendered in casual, uncritical, and altogether
useless terms. This section develops a concrete conceptual understanding of the
rule of law that also does justice to its critical potential. From this conception of
the rule of law, it is possible to derive a critique of retroactivity, double jeopardy,
and status-based laws couched in their threat to the project of restraining and
rationalizing sovereignty. A related aim of this section is to highlight the
political significance of the rule of law and the danger that inheres in abrogating
its norms. Together, these inquiries stress both the possibility of a juridical
critique of habitual offender laws from a rule of law perspective, and the
implications of such a critique. However, the discussion benefits from a
preliminary account of the rule of law's potential as a basis for critical inquiry,
because for many this is not obvious.
A. The Rule of Law and the Possibility of Critique
The rule of law is often viewed as a conservative construct, one that affirms
the existing social order and defends it from critique. To a considerable degree,
this characterization is correct; the rule of law presupposes the maintenance of
legal order in the face of persistent, legally authorized dynamics of social
inequality, alienation, and exploitation, as well as important limitations on the
ability of the state to redress these dynamics. The construct has a strong
functional and ideological association with capitalism and its social structure.
Furthermore, the rule of law throws a veil over the structures of power in society,
which further insulates both capitalism and the state itself from political critique.
Initially, all of these factors seem to vitiate the rule of law's value as a basis for
critique.
Indeed, in prevailing discourse on the rule of law, these tendencies have been
embraced by those who cast the construct as a simple euphemism for the legal
order of capitalist society. For those on the right, the rule of law's association
with capitalism is reduced to the conjoined ideas that the rule of law (and the
norms that come with it) is only possible under capitalism, and that the
Spring 2006]
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abrogation of capitalism necessarily portends the rule of law's destruction and an
eventual descent into authoritarianism. 12 For many leftists the rule of law is often
so closely tied to capitalism that it must yield in the course of any attempt to
transcend this social system and its many ills.1 3 For others, even less concerned
to divine the construct's deeper meaning, it simply denotes the existence of a
legal order. 14
All these perspectives avoid the rule of law's fundamental grounding in a
campaign to limit and rationalize sovereignty, from which derives a much more
complicated relationship to capitalism and a conceptual structure irreducible to
the mere existence of a legal order, or to the legal order that happens to prevail in
capitalist society. Understood in these more ambitious and ambiguous terms, the
rule of law takes on both critical and affirmative meanings. Ideologically, it
endorses the status quo--even if not as thoroughly as its critics on the left or
proponents on the right would want. But, understood from the standpoint of its
opposition to sovereignty, the rule of law also exposes important shortcomings in
the prevailing legal order. Significantly, it highlights the problem of unbounded
state power, often articulated in the most arbitrary and discriminatory ways, as
well as outright lawlessness in governance. The rule of law demonstrates how
illiberal the liberal state continues to be and how far it remains from its own
pretensions of constituting a "free" society. Similarly, the rule of law is critical
in its ability to expose political and legal changes that further corrode the legal
system's attachment to rule of law norms. In these contingent ways the rule of
law can be understood as a critical construct-even by a staunch leftist.
B. The Rule of Law and the Prohibition of Retroactivity, Double Jeopardy, and
Status Crimes
The full thrust of the rule of law's critical tendencies follows not simply from
its opposition to sovereignty, but also from the particular way that the construct
articulates this agenda. For figures like Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, the
rule of law was above all else, a way of conceptualizing the limits of sovereignty
and, with this, the rights of "man" relative to the state. 15 For Rousseau, this
12. For a more or less theoretical explication of this position, see FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE
ROAD TO SERFDOM xxiii, 80-96 (1994). For more practical and functional arguments of this sort,
see, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, The Rule of Law, Freedom, and Prosperity, 10 SuP. CT. ECON. REv. 1,
3-26 (2002); 0. Lee Reed, Law, the Rule of Law, and Property: A Foundation for the Private
Market and Business Study, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 441, 447-66 (2001); Thomas Carothers, The Rule of
Law Revival, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, March/Apr. 1998, at 95, 104-06; Steven Radelet & Jeffery Sachs,
Asia's Reemergence, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 1997, at 44, 58-59.
13. ROBERTO M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 238-42 (1976). See also Morton J.
Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561, 565-66 (1976) (book
review).
14. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 5 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175,
1178-80 (1989). On this approach to the rule of law, and its limitations, see GEOFFREY DE Q.
WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW: FOUNDATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 11-14 (1988).
15. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOvERNMENT chs. XI, XIV (1988); JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT bk. II, ch. 6 (1968); CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE
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sovereignty-limiting agenda depended on two basic principles: the concept of
legality, by which sovereignty is subordinated to and limited by law; and the
concept of legal generality, by which the only authentic law is that which
assumes a general form.16 From these principles flowed a number of subsidiary
normative injunctions with which the rule of law has come to be more widely
associated: the differentiation of state from civil society, the concept of rights
against the state, the conjoined ideas of separation of powers and judicial
independence, as well as substantial limitations on the scope of criminal justice
authority. 17
The importance of the principle of legality to the rule of law's agenda to
restrain sovereignty is obvious-enough, at least, to enjoy prominence in many
contemporary interpretations of the rule of law.' 8 While inadequate alone to
ground every aspect of the rule of law's opposition to sovereignty, this concern
for legality is not misplaced. At its root, legality is the claim that law is
independent of the state, that the law enjoys a sovereignty of its own, over and
above that of the state, and that the state may assert its sovereignty only through
the law and consistent with it.' 9 As Neumann argues, each of these functions is
vital to distinguishing law, as a "rational" enterprise consistent with the rule of
law's sovereignty-limiting agenda, from law in a simply "political" and
"volitional" sense, as a device that lends the imprimatur of legal legitimacy to
whatever acts the state might dress up in legal form.2° In this respect, legality is
essential to a meaningful construction of the rule of law.
The importance of legal generality to the rule of law construct, which is not as
commonly recognized as that of legality, is also a key concern for Neumann. For
Neumann, who draws explicitly on Rousseau, legal generality consists in "an
abstract rule which does not mention particular cases or individually nominated
persons, but which is issued in advance to apply to all cases and all persons in the
abstract. 21 In Neumann's view, this principle is of decisive importance, for it
MONTEQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. XI (1991).
16. ROUSSEAU, supra note 15, at bk. III, ch. 12.
17. See LOCKE, supra note 15, at chs. XI, XIV; ROUSSEAU, supra note 15, at bk. II, ch. 6; DE
SECONDAT, supra note 15, at bk. XI. See also Franz L. Neumann, The Change in the Function of
Law in Modern Society, in THE RULE OF LAW UNDER SIEGE 101, 102-04 (William E. Scheuerman
ed., 1996).
18. See, e.g., FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE HABITS OF LEGALITY: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE
OF LAW (1996). Cf Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional
Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 1307, 1326-28 (2001).
19. Legality is, in this sense, an aspiration, inasmuch as the separation of law and state can
never be perfect; and yet as an aspiration the concept remains important to rationalizing the
ungoverned aspects of state power.
20. FRANZ L. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW: POLITICAL THEORY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN
MODERN SOCIETY 212 (1986); Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society,
supra note 17, at 104-05.
21. For this reason legal generality is the conceptual centerpiece of the rule of law's classical
doctrinal iterations. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 20, at 214-22; Franz Neumann, The
Concept of Political Freedom, in THE RULE OF LAW UNDER SIEGE, supra note 17, at 195, 199. For
a similar view of this point, see JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND
MORALITY 212-13 (1979). Cf ROUSSEAU, supra note 15, at bk. II, ch. 6 ("When I say the law is
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structures a broad array of checks on sovereignty, not least the principles of
separation of powers and judicial independence. These principles are
presupposed, he argues, by the fact that the substance of legal generality cannot
be preserved unless the roles of administering and enforcing the law are
segregated from that of establishing its nominal, formal meaning, and that all
these functions are segregated from that of deciding the law's meaning in an
adjudicative sense. To provide otherwise would allow general laws to be
rendered, unfettered, into individual measures tailored to individual cases.22
Similarly, legal generality presupposes the minimization of discretion at all levels
of governance. Unbounded discretion necessarily reduces generality to a veil for
individual decision making.23 Finally, among its immediate implications, legal
generality is antithetical to retroactive laws. Retroactive laws cannot be truly
general because, by their very nature, these laws cannot disclaim knowledge of
the identity of the individuals or particular activities they regulate.24 In
Neumann's words, a "law which provides for retroactivity contains ?articular
commands inasmuch as the facts to which the law refers already exist." 5 At the
same time, individuals facing these laws must confront them as a means of
governing their status, inasmuch as the law can always be changed to embrace
their own unique qualities.
The latter point about retroactivity leads to another observation that Neumann
makes on the nature of legal generality. For Neumann, only laws couched in
specific, formal statements are truly general and can meaningfully restrain the
sovereign. The rule of law requires that the law be both as general as possible
and also, within this framework of generality, as specific as possible;26 the law,, ~,,27...
must be "definite in its abstractness. Only in this guise is the sovereign
prevented from ruling by "general principles," "standards of conduct," or other
devices that conceal individualized, discretionary, or altogether unbounded acts
always general, I mean that the law considers all subjects collectively and all actions in the abstract;
it does not consider any individual man or specific action.").
22. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society, supra note 17, at 118.
Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 21, at 200. Cf CARL SCHMITT, LEGALITY
AND LEGITIMACY 70-71 (2004).
23. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 20, at 257; Neumann, The Change in the
Function of Law in Modern Society, supra note 17, at 113-15. Cf Guido Pincione, Market Rights
and the Rule of Law: A Case for Procedural Constitutionalism, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 397,
400 (2003).
24. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 20, at 295.
25. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society, supra note 17, at 107.
See also Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 21, at 200; FRANz L. NEUMANN,
BEHEMOTH: THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM, 1933-1944, at 445 (1944)
[hereinafter NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH]. Carl Schmitt makes a similar argument in his account of the
features of the "legislative state." ScHMrrT, supra note 22, at 3-4, 18-19.
26. "[F]irst, law must be a rule that does not mention specific cases or individual persons but
which is issued in advance to apply to all cases and all persons in the abstract, and second, it must
be specific, as specific as possible in view of its general formulation." Neumann, The Concept of
Political Freedom, supra note 21, at 199.
27. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society, supra note 17, at 116.
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of the sovereign in the nominal guise of law.28 In this vein, Neumann posits a
hostility between the rule of law and rules grounded in "reason," "morality," or
6 ,,29equity.
Conceptualized this way, the rule of law has strong normative implications-
implications that in turn affirm the importance of legality and legal generality to
its overall agenda.30 By itself, the principle of legality implies some limits on the
power of the state to interfere with the lives of its subjects; for such interference
must be founded in a body of law independent of, and not simply reducible to,
the whims of the sovereign. When the principle of generality is also adhered to,
the rule of law is able to articulate a broad range of "negative" freedoms "from
the state" in the form of personal, economic, and political freedoms.32 These
follow from legal generality's function in confining the power of the state over
individuals to that which the state can articulate in anonymous, formal, and
abstract terms, as well as from the mechanisms that legal generality
presupposes-separation of powers, judicial independence, non-retroactivity (or
"prospectivity"), and the like-and their function in further circumscribing the
limits of sovereignty. In particular, by requiring that sovereignty be expressed in
anonymous, formal, and abstract ways, the principle of legal generality also
advances the formal equality of citizens under the law, as this norm inheres in the
nature of such rules.33
28. What Neumann means is that laws lacking adequate specificity reserve so much discretion
to the state that they can only be "a mask under which individual measures are hidden." In order to
maintain true generality, "all essential facts" to which the law refers must be "clearly defined." Id.
at 107-08, 116.
29. Id. at 107.
30. Or as Neumann puts it, "We understand by the Rule of Law a domination through general
norms, and consequently through determinate material norms." NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW,
supra note 20, at 8. Unlike a regime of natural law, the rule of law articulates these substantive
norms indirectly and, in a sense, ironically-by the separation of law from morality. NEUMANN,
BEHEMOTH, supra note 25, at 441,443.
31. Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 21, at 198-201. See also
NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 20, at 32.
32. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 20, at 212. Personal freedoms, in this sense,
entail privacy, freedom from arrest without process, freedom from bills of attainder, and the like;
political freedoms include freedom of association and assembly, freedom of the press, and freedom
from state interference with the content of political views; economic freedoms involve freedom of
private property, trade, and private investment; and freedom of association in the labor context
revolves around the right to organize labor unions and to engage in collective bargaining and labor
protests. These freedoms are not absolute, but rather protected from interference outside the
framework of law or in contravention of the principle of generality. Neumann, The Change in the
Function of Law in Modern Society, supra note 17, at 108; Neumann, The Concept of Political
Freedom, supra note 21, at 197-200.
33. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society, supra note 17, at 117-
18. As Neumann puts it, "A minimum of equality is guaranteed, for if the lawmaker must deal with
persons and situations in the abstract he thereby treats persons and situations as equals and is
precluded from discriminating against any one specific person." Neumann, The Concept of
Political Freedom, supra note 21, at 201, 206.
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These norms of negative freedom and formal equality describe what Neumann
calls the rule of law's "ethical" function. 34 This function may be viewed as the
construct's ultimate moral and political justification. In Neumann's view, this
provides a definite, if ultimately insufficient, advancement in the quest for an
enlightened, emancipated human condition-and a bulwark against
authoritarianism. Again, it is not to the rule of law in the abstract that this
function is owed, but rather to legality and legal generality and to a realization of
the norms and structures implied by these principles.
35
Conceived in such terms, the rule of law speaks broadly to the limits of
sovereignty in the criminal justice context. In addition to hostility to excessive
discretion, the abrogation of separation of powers, and the compromise of
judicial independence, these principles imply other concerns. These concerns
range from the limitation of crime and punishment to that which is defined by
law (the principles, nulla crimen sine lege and nulla peona sine lege), the
presumption of innocence and the right to a trial and other processes, the
prohibition of vigilantism and overtly lawless behavior under color of law or
otherwise in the hidden interests of the state.36
Also critical in this regard is the rule of law's opposition to retroactive laws.
Such laws are covertly individualized-or at least, inherently incompatible with
the effective, reliable prohibition of individualized governance. Accordingly,
retroactive laws are also inconsistent not only with legal generality in the
abstract, but with legal generality's implications of negative freedoms and formal
equality. By allowing the state to single out subjects for special treatment with
its criminal authority, and by allowing it to destroy any expectations on the limits
of sovereignty, retroactive laws permit the destruction of these values.37
There is nothing about the rule of law's hostility to retroactive laws, double
jeopardy, or status-based laws that implies any confinement to the criminal
justice context. On one level, sovereignty is sovereignty; a taking or even a
judgment in tort might be more oppressive in fact and more central to the
interests of the state than a "criminal" traffic citation. Nevertheless, the courts
have often limited the application of constitutional doctrines that would advance
these rule of law norms to explicitly criminal cases.38  And, however
34. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society, supra note 17, at 117.
35. See supra notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
36. On these implications of the rule of law, see generally, ALLEN, supra note 18; SAMUEL
WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950-1990
(1993).
37. Neumann's view of the incompatibility of retroactive laws with the rule of law is shared by
other scholars, including, for example, both Lon Fuller and Jerome Hall, for whom the source of
this incompatibility inheres in the principle of legality. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 51-62
(1964); JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 61-64 (1947).
38. The Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Constitution apply only to "punitive" measures. Calder
v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1789). This rule is grounded in what appears to be an erroneous
interpretation of original intent. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS'
CONSTITUTION 65-74 (1988); Harold Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil
Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L. REv. 2143, 2145 (1996); Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against
Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REv. 775, 791-92 n.51
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disingenuous these limiting constructions have been in practice-and the courts
have really pushed the distinction to its limits39-the kind of sovereignty that
characterizes the criminal justice system, with its explicitly punitive, coercive
aspects and its express invocation of public power, is generally more problematic
than that which characterizes the realm of civil justice.
Also, a rule of law construct based in legality and legal generality is
incompatible with double jeopardy laws. To permit the state multiple
prosecutions for the same act or event allows it, in practice, to individualize law
contrary to legal generality as well its ulterior norms of negative freedom and
formal equality. Consistent with this logic, cases involving especially heinous or
politically offensive defendants can, for example, be singled out for multiple
trials to the point of successful conviction--or, as it may be, multiple punishment
to the point of effective persecution. Also, over the course of multiple
proceedings, the law can be given a fine-tuned meaning to capture any defendant
particularly offensive to the state. In like fashion, double jeopardy makes a
mockery of the principle of legality; it divests the law of any definitive meaning,
replacing it with an evolving contingency vis-A-vis a particular defendant.
Indeed, the lack of any prohibition of double jeopardy suggests the power of the
state to essentially create and enforce new laws seriatim until, from the state's
standpoint, adequate conviction and punishment has been achieved. By all these
routes, double jeopardy reduces the law from the check on sovereignty that the
rule of law proposes to a simple mechanism, inherently contingent in meaning
and devoid of any effective restraining functions, for the facilitation and
legitimation of unbounded sovereignty. In the double jeopardy context, whatever
limitations on sovereignty might remain, the state may reduce to dead letters.4 °
(1936). Civil measures are subject only to much weaker regulation under the Due Process Clauses.
See Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV.
1056, 1058, 1063-67 (1997). The Double Jeopardy Clause has been subjected to a similar
construction. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997); United States v. Bajakajian, 524
U.S. 321, 331-32 (1998).
39. Courts have, for example, insulated sexual "predator" civil commitment programs and
sexual offender registration schemes from challenges under the Ex Post Facto Clauses by deferring
to their nominal characterization as "civil" regimes. See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 370-71
(finding the state sexual "predator" civil commitment program not punitive for purposes of Ex Post
Facto Clause); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003) (holding the state sex offender
registration scheme not punitive for purposes of Ex Post Facto Clause). A similar construction of
the Double Jeopardy Clause has protected these regimes from challenge under that doctrine as well.
See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369; Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 472-76 (6th Cir. 1999).
See also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 331-32 (1998) (finding civil forfeiture attendant
to criminal prosecution not punitive). On the courts' willingness to defer to nominal
characterization of coercive regimes as "non-punitive" in both these contexts, see Susan R. Klein,
Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRnM. L. REV. 679, 698-707 (1999).
40. Even the Supreme Court has articulated its support for the double jeopardy clause in these
terms. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 122 (1904) (holding the prohibition of double
jeopardy as "essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom"); United States
v. Martin Lenin Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-
88 (1957). Cf George Anastaplo, Amendments to the Constitution of the United States: A
Commentary, 23 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 631, 708 (1992).
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Moreover, embedded in the conception of the rule of law is an opposition to
status-based criminal laws, or status crimes. These are laws that articulate the
state's authority over particular subjects in a manner based not on any particular
actions, but rather on inherent characteristics. The nature of status crimes'
incompatibility with the rule of law-which incidentally was lost on Rousseau
himself4 '-inheres in several dynamics. First, inasmuch as status crimes do not
naturally tend to require any specific act on the part of those subject to them,42
such laws are necessarily individualized. Significantly, in the requirement of a
discrete act as a predicate of liability (and punishment) inheres the means by
which the criminal law retains a semantic commitment to legal generality-the
means by which it adheres to the abstractness and formality through which the
rule of law defines the legitimate forms of sovereignty. The act itself provides
the conceptual basis for articulating liability in truly general, as opposed to
individualized, terms. The less there is an act requirement, the more liability
must turn on general characteristics, and the determination of these elements on
the characteristics of the individual defendant.43 Indeed, in their very use of
status to denominate the sovereign's reach, status-based laws identify discrete
classes of individuals or groups (or, alternatively, "acts" that are cognizable only
in terms of such individualized forms) over which such sovereignty is to be
asserted." It is for this reason that the social function of vagrancy laws, the
quintessential status crimes in American history, almost invariably revolved
around programs of labor regulation and control of the working class and racial
minorities.
Inherent in this characterization of status crimes is the kind of convergence of
governance by "general principles" and "standards" with governance by
individual measure that Neumann anticipated and so contrasted to authentic legal
generality. Consistent with this, those subject to status-based laws not only lose
the protections of legal generality, they also lose the condition of formal equali6
under the law, and they are exposed to the state singling them out for sanction.
41. Rousseau held explicitly that the rule of law could accommodate not only "privileges," so
long as the law "did not nominate the persons who shall have those privileges"; he also held that
the law could establish "classes of citizen, and even specify the qualifications which shall give
access to those several classes"-so long as the law did not nominate specific individuals.
ROUSSEAU, supra note 15, at bk. I, ch. 6, pp. 81-82.
42. This concept inheres in the Supreme Court's definition of status crimes. See, e.g.,
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
43. This has actually been a concern, at times, of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225, 227-30 (1957). But see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968).
44. Just as retroactive laws are, according to Neumann, individual measures, inasmuch they
entail not "an indeterminate number of concrete" cases, but rather "a definite number of cases fully
materialized in the past"--so too are status-based laws. NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH, supra note 25, at
445.
45. See, e.g., Ahmed W. White, A Different Kind of Labor Law: Vagrancy and the Regulation
of Harvest Labor, 1913-1924, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 667, 679 (2004); Amy Dru Stanley, Beggars
Can't Be Choosers: Compulsion and Contract in Postbellum America, 78 J. AM. HIST. 1265, 1273
(1992).
46. Neumann's critique of status-based laws is largely contained in his account of the
transformation of German criminal law under the Nazi regime. NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH, supra note
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A related problem with such laws is that they leave little for the state to prove as
a prerequisite to activating its sovereignty: a subject's conformance to the
relevant prohibited status is either entirely manifest or so insusceptible to proof
that none is required.47 The criminal process devolves from a manner of ensuring
adherence to rule of law norms into a pro forma exercise, or even an outright
sham. In either case, the law again ceases to act as a restraint on sovereignty and
instead merely authorizes its unregulated application. The principle of legality
looses all meaning in this context.
C. The Rule of Law and the Specter ofAuthoritarianism
Neumann's value to this critique transcends his elaboration of a conception of
the rule of law that condemns retroactivity, double jeopardy, and status crimes.
Beyond this, he accounts the rule of law's importance to modem legal and
political systems, and the dangers that inhere in allowing these laws to
compromise the rule of law's normative structure. This argument is all the more
persuasive in that it is nuanced, non-doctrinaire, and invested with a critical
sensibility. For Neumann, the rule of law is simultaneously problematic in its
relationship to the question of human emancipation, particularly in its
relationship to capitalism, and indispensable to that same cause, in its ideological
opposition to the deep currents of authoritarianism that flow out of the reign of
capitalism in modem society. This contingent perspective counters the view of
many leftists that the rule of law is simply worthless or even fraudulent, and the
conservative view that it is utterly sacrosanct and inviolable; it also counters the
overly pragmatic view that aspects of the rule of law can be sacrificed here and
there with little regard for the risks to the construct or the ultimate specter of
authoritarianism that might accompany this.
Neumann's perspective derives from a complex view of the relationship
between the rule of law and capitalism. For Neumann, the rule of law is both
functionally and genetically intertwined with the history of capitalism.
Capitalism's system of free competition-or, more accurately, of the dominance
of private property, wage-labor, and commodity production, in which the element
of competition is relatively strong-requires the economic freedom that the rule
48of law guarantees. This economic freedom is not simply abstract; in its
protection of these institutions from regulation by the state is a specific support
for private property and contract.49 Likewise, the methods by which the rule of
law limits the power of the state-its mandate of judicial independence and
separation of powers, it minimization of discretion, and its prohibition of
25, at 447-58.
47. Otto Kirchheimer, Criminal Law in National Socialist Germany, in THE RULE OF LAW
UNDER SIEGE, supra note 17, at 172, 173 (describing this issue in the context of criminal law under
the Nazi regime). See, e.g., Texas v. Powell, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
48. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society, supra note 17, at 116-
17; Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 21, at 201-05.
49. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society, supra note 17, at 109.
See also NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH, supra note 25, at 442-43.
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retroactivity, for example-all advance capitalism's functional need for
predictable and calculable transactions. °  Moreover, the rule of law both
obscures and reifies the power of capitalist elites who dominate the state and its
legal system and wield hegemonic power in capitalist society. Significantly, the
construct "disgui[ses] the real holders of power in the state;" it falsely expresses
questions of freedom and equality as legal questions and as questions of political
right, as opposed to questions of class conflict;5 2 and it rather narrowly
circumscribes the permissible avenues of social reform. 53 Neumann is equally
appreciative of the way the rule of law, in the very process of restraining
sovereignty, affirms and legitimates the power of the state and curtails the right
to resist its authority. 54 In some respects, the rule of law is as much a means of
limiting individual sovereignty as it is a means of limiting that of the state.
Similarly, in limiting the authority of the state, the rule of law also functions as a
limit on democracy-at least to the extent that the sovereignty of the state is ever
truly a reflection of democratic will. In these respects, the rule of law is a
fundamentally conservative construct, the juridical foundation of an exploitative
and alienating social order.
Unlike some critics of the rule of law from the left,55 and occasionally from the
right,56 Neumann retains a genuine appreciation for the rule of law despite these
50. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 20, at 255-56; Neumann, Change in the Function
of Law in Modern Society, supra note 17, at 106, 109-12, 116. Neumann also stresses the rule of
law's role in unseating aristocratic rule. In his view, its freedoms and its formal equality inured to
the particular benefit of the bourgeoisie in its struggle against the aristocracy, as did the rule of
law's condemnation of the forms of aristocratic rule. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 20,
at 213; Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 21, at 201-02. Cf 2 MAX WEBER,
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 839-59 (Guenther Roth & Claus eds., 1978).
51. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society, supra note 17, at 115.
See also NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 20, at 213, 254-55; Neumann, The Concept of
Political Freedom, supra note 21, at 202-03. Cf JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRIsIs 21-24
(Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975).
52. "The invocation of the law as the sole sovereign and the dictum that sovereignty is 'a
government of law and not men' make it superfluous to mention that, in reality, men do rule, even
when they rule within the framework of the law." Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in
Modern Society, supra note 17, at 115.
53. Id. at 115-16.
54. Neumann writes, "The liberal state has always been as strong as the political and social
situation and the interests of society have demanded .... It has been a strong state precisely in
those spheres in which it had to be strong and in which it wanted to be strong." Id. at 101. Cf
NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 20, at 198, 214. On the right of resistance under the rule
of law, see Otto Kirchheimer, Legality and Legitimacy, in SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF
LAW 130, 132 (Leena Tanner & Keith Tribe trans., Keith Tribe ed., 1987); SCHMITT, supra note 22,
at 19.
55. For many leftist critics, the rule of law's supportive relationship to capitalism, its tendency
to reify power and to conceal the nature of exploitation, and its evident incompatibility with
socialism, social democracy, and even the capitalist welfare state all counsel its abandonment. See,
e.g., UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 13, at 238-42; Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An
Unqualified Human Good?, supra note 13, at 565-66. See also MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 59-61 (1987).
56. The conservative critique of the rule of law as a sham is best embodied in the work of Carl
Schmitt. For Schmitt, the rule of law is a fundamentally incoherent construct. Its attempt to install
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problematic associations. Indeed, by this negotiation of left and right
perspectives on the rule of law, Neumann is able to capture a sense of the rule of
law's value as a critical construct.57 Neumann stresses the real value of the rule
of law's ethical and political functions. He notes that even negative freedoms
and formal equality offer real benefits to the "working class and the poor," while
the rule of law helps to sustain their social subordination at the same time.58 The
rule of law at least "allows the weak to retain some legal opportunity.
59
Neumann also appreciates how, by their aspirational tendencies, the rule of law's
norms pose moral and ethical challenges to-what one might call imminent
critiques of-class rule and exploitation. However inadequate notions of
negative freedoms and formal equality might be, however much they accord with
the social realities of modem, capitalist society, they challenge that reality with
their incipient calls for fuller freedom and more complete equality. If not an
"unqualified good," as it is for E.P. Thompson, the rule of law is, in Neumann's
view, a qualified good.6' It is from this that the rule of law derives its function as
a truly critical construct.
Interestingly, Neumann understands that even without its incipient tendencies
coming to bear to deprecate its value to the poor and working class, the rule of
law has never been fully realized in modem society. For him, as for us today, the
legal system is rife with exceptions to the rule of law's program, even within the
most formidable redoubts of "liberal democracy. '' 62 Further, Neumann
understands that the impediments to the realization of the rule of law inhere not
in either the underdevelopment of capitalism or capitalism's perversion, as the
the law as sovereign over the state is in Schmitt's view inconsistent with the state maintaining its
"true" source of legitimacy in "the people." Schmitt also saw the rule of law as weakening the
state, leaving it open to exploitation by socialists, communists, and other "enemy" factions. For
Schmitt, these dynamics demand a repudiation of the rule of law in favor of an explicitly
authoritarian regime based in the concepts of "decisionism," "exceptionalism," and "general
principles." Schmitt essentially identified in the rule of law an inherent function in concealing
individualist, concrete features-in his words, "decisionist" elements. For Schmitt these
problematic dynamics as well as the urgency of repudiating the rule of law are heightened by the
rise of the welfare state, which afforded him proof of the rule of law's corruption. SCHMrrr, supra
note 22, at 20-24, 28-35, 70-71; WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, BETWEEN THE NORM AND THE
EXCEPTION: THE FRANKFORT SCHOOL AND THE RULE OF LAW 10, 13-14 (1994). See also DAVID
DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCHMITT, HANS KELSEN AND HERMANN HELLER IN
WEIMAR 38-101 (1997).
57. By saying that Neumann negotiates these issues, I do not mean to suggest that his approach
is based simply in the logic of pragmatic compromise. Neumann's ambivalent perspective suggests
more the influence of historicism than pragmatism.
58. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society, supra note 17, at 117-
18. This perspective on the rule of law is similar to that of Marx, who saw the development of
freedom under the law as a "big step forward" that constitutes "the last form of human
emancipation within the prevailing scheme of things." Id.; NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra
note 20, at 33-37.
59. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society, supra note 17, at 117-
18; NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 20, at 33-37.
60. See NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 20, at 33-37.
61. See E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 266 (1975).
62. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society, supra note 17, at 117.
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likes of both conservatives like F.A. Hayek and leftists like Unger contend, but
rather in its very structure-what he calls the irrationality of liberal society and
63the capitalist economy.
This perspective allows Neumann to conclude that, far from being doomed by
the mere advent of the welfare state, the rule of law could be better realized
within a system of socialism or social democracy. 64 The key underpinning of this
position is recognition that, in an unregulated environment, capitalists come to
wield extraordinary power over working people and the poor-power that may
use freedom to destroy freedom and equality to destroy equal chances under the
law. In this world, the social inequality that follows from legal equality threatens
to destroy any meaning that the rule of law might have for the lower classes.
65
To elaborate on Neumann's insight, in the context of unlimited legal equality,
private sovereignty nonetheless imposes its own authority over working class
people and the poor. This kind of sovereignty is able to manipulate the power of
the state and its legal system into serving as its silent partner, thereby further
undermining the rule of law's agenda. Such manipulation entails an extension
and intensification of the state's social control functions over the lower classes,
even further jeopardizing rule of law norms. In fact, this very dynamic likely
describes the political underpinnings of habitual offender laws and the nature of
their affront to the rule of law.
In line with this perspective, Neumann explains that despite their resort to the
rule of law as an ideological foil against popular social reforms, capitalists
themselves have little in the way of deep commitment to the rule of law-
particularly where adhering to rule of law norms impinges on their ability to
exploit labor, market their products, and accumulate more capital.66 For this
63. Id.
64. See SCHEUERMAN, BETWEEN THE NORM AND THE EXCEPTION, supra note 56, at 43-55. See
Claus Offe, The Problem of Social Power in Franz L. Neumann's Thought, 10 CONSTELLATIONS
211, 212-14, 219-20 (2003). This impulse was particularly strong in Neumann's early work; in
later years, he apparently developed a greater skepticism about the welfare state. Id. at 224-25. In
this respect, Neumann contradicts an array of scholars from across the political spectrum who view
the rule of law as uniquely compatible with liberal capitalism and fundamentally incompatible with
the welfare state. This position rests on the idea of a close functional connection between the rule
of law and competitive capitalism. More controversial is the idea that the welfare state necessarily
entails such a proliferation of "exceptional" decision-making on the basis of vague, ad hoc, non-
general rules, that the rule of law simply cannot be sustained. Among those who have argued this
position are conservatives like F.A. Hayek, leftists like Roberto Unger, and reactionaries like
Schmitt. For Hayek, the implication is that the welfare state is illegitimate. HAYEK, supra note 12,
at xxiii, 80-96. For both Unger, the implication is that the rule of law must yield to the cause of
social justice. UNGER, supra note 13, at 238-42. For Schmitt, both the rule of law and the welfare
state must be supplanted by an authoritarian system that is, in his view, more compatible with a
legitimate political order. SCHMITT, supra note 22, at 20-24, 27-35.
65. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society, supra note 17, at 121;
Neumann, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 21, at 204-05, 210. See also
SCHEUERMAN, supra note 56, at 50-55, 127-32.
66. That is to say, the capitalist commitment to the rule of law is fundamentally instrumentalist
and limited to occasions where rule of law norms happen to accord with their interests-something
that is hardly guaranteed.
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reason, Neumann argues that capitalists, and powerful monopoly capitalists in
particular (who often have no need at all for legality or legal generality), emerge
as the greatest historical enemies of the rule of law. And capitalism itself, if
realistically understood as an amalgamation of capitalists' interests, hardly
deserves its reputation as a steadfast pillar of the rule of law.67
Motivated by this perspective, Neumann endorses a partial reconfiguration of
rule of law norms in the interest of better realizing the construct's overall
normative program. Neumann does not deny that the welfare state, let alone a
regime of social democracy, requires state interventions of both the magnitude
and kind that necessarily offend rule of law norms: regulatory agencies have to
accrue the power to control private property and contract; economic freedoms
and the freedom of the individual within the economic sphere have to yield to the
aims of social justice; and the state may increase its reliance on ad hoc,
"reasonable," and even individualized measures. As far as monopolies are
concerned, such approaches may be indispensable to any effective regulatory
agenda.68 But Neumann views these kinds of reforms as justified because they
are so essential to advancing rule of law norms and sustaining the coherence of
the construct itself.
69
Neumann's willingness to pursue social reform at the partial expense of the
rule of law reflects an interesting and, in many ways very useful, perspective.
Neumann is not simply an instrumentalist or pragmatist prepared to abrogate the
rule of law wherever doing so will plausibly serve the construct's overall agenda.
Rather, Neumann's willingness to sacrifice the construct seems clearly limited to
circumstances where doing so would enable a genuine, far-reaching program of
social reform that would respond to problems that inevitably confront rule of law
and its normative program in capitalist society. 70  Even the regulation of
monopolies gives Neumann pause as a reason to endorse individual measures
over general rules-not least because he appreciates the ability of monopolists to
67. See, e.g., NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH, supra note 25, at 440-58.
68. Neumann writes, "In the economic sphere . . . the postulate of the generality of the law
becomes absurd if the legislature is no longer concerned with equal competitions, but with
monopolies violating that principle of equality on the market .... NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW,
supra note 20, at 275-76. See also Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern
Society, supra note 17, at 125-27.
69. In this contradictory tendency to authorize the abrogation of rule of law norms for the
greater benefit of the construct, Neumann takes a position not entirely unlike that of his one-time
teacher and eventual adversary, Schmitt. The difference, in a nutshell, between Neumann's and
Schmitt's orientation on this issue is that Neumann remained fundamentally committed to the rule
of law and its ideals, while for Schmitt the unmasking of the rule of law deficiencies and the
commitment to redressing those deficiencies was but part of a larger project of de-legitimating the
construct and justifying its total repudiation. On the many connections between Neumann and
Schmitt, see SCHEUERMAN, supra note 56, at 1-10.
70. This is not to say that Neumann's arguments are beyond criticism. A radical opponent of
capitalism such as Marx himself might embrace the rule of law in a contingent way-as Marx
does-without putting any faith in the possibility of reforming capitalism either by welfarist or
social democratic means. Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in KARL MARX: SELECTED
WRITINGS 46, 46-64 (David McLellan ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1977).
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turn such a juridical program to their own advantage. 71 Neumann realizes that
challenges to the rule of law-especially successful challenges-are more apt to
come from reactionary quarters in the first place. It is in this spirit that Neumann
writes:
If one accepts the view that the generality of law is nothing more than a way of
satisfying the needs of free competition, then the conclusion is inevitable that the
substitution of organized state capitalism for free competition requires the
substitution of the command of the Leader or the general principle for the general
law, the independent judiciary, and the separation of powers.
72
Neumann's willingness to compromise aspects of the rule of law was tempered
throughout by a concern for the adversary relationship between the rule of law
and the rise of fascism. This concern reflected Neumann's broader
preoccupation with the rule of law's fate in the unfolding of modem society. For
Neumann, the rule of law is not just imperfectly realized in modern society; a
defining feature of the construct's history is its tremendous vulnerability to being
cast aside to the ultimate benefit of authoritarianism.
In one of the first and most influential studies of the legal structure of fascism,
and of Nazism in particular, Neumann stresses the important role that the
repudiation of the rule of law played in the consolidation of fascist rule.73
Among other things, he highlights the success with which the Nazi regime
appropriated a jurisprudence rooted in general principles, individual measures
(often explicit privileges in behalf of large businesses), and inequality under the
law-all of which had been initially legitimated as a tool of social democracy
and the regulation of monopolies-to structure and legitimate its rule.74 This
jurisprudence eventually reduced law to "a technical means for the achievement
of specific political aims. It is merely the command of the sovereign.,
75
Neumann stresses that this jurisprudence, in which law did not govern but only
justified, was vital to the functioning of the Nazi regime-a point on which more
contemporary scholarship backs him up.
76
71. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 20, at 276-82. Neumann is particularly
concerned in this regard with the way the idea of governance by "general principles," which in
theory may be vital to the effective regulation of strong business interests, may be high-jacked by
those very interests to further their aims. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern
Society, supra note 17, at 131-32.
72. NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH, supra note 25, at 444-45.
73. Neumann tended to use the term "fascism" to describe a broader tendency toward
reactionary, non-socialistic, authoritarian rule. Thus, for Neumann Nazism was usually, though not
always, presented as a form of fascism-rather than, as is often the case, a similar, but distinct
system. Id at 71-75. In this article, I follow Neumann in describing Nazism as a form of fascism.
74. Id. at 448; Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society, supra note
17, at 132-33.
75. NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH, supra note 25, at 448.
76. See, e.g., INGO MOLLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COuRTs OF THE THIRD REICH (Deborah L.
Schneider trans., 1991); Matthew Lippman, The White Rose: Judges and Justice in the Third Reich,
15 CONN. J. INT'L L. 95, 197-201 (2000).
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Of particular relevance in the Nazi assault on the rule of law is the regime's
embrace of retroactivity, double jeopardy, and status crimes. Under Nazi rule,
the state often issued retroactive laws-particularly relative to the revocation of
citizenship, the scope of the death penalty, and the punishment of political
crimes.77 Eventually, this trend culminated in a broad endorsement of retroactive
prosecution under a revised criminal code.78 As Neumann's colleague Otto
Kirchheimer also shows, the embrace of retroactivity was a key component in a
larger campaign to un-tether the criminal law completely from any adherence to
rule of law norms. 79 This involved redrafting the criminal law in accordance
with general legal principles as opposed to true legal generality, which then
provided a semantic structure for a shift from the criminalization of discrete acts
accompanied by particular subjective states of mind to the criminalization of
status. Thus, the Nazis redefined the concept of criminality in phenomenological
terms, in terms of the conformance of the criminal suspect with a predefined
"criminal type" as well as supposedly "racial" categories.80 Status crimes and
other status-based laws were invoked to fine-tune the persecution of ideological
and racial enemies. 81 A "two tiered" system of criminal justice emerged, in
which the criminal law, both by customary practice and by formal rule,
simultaneously denied to "undesirables" whatever protection the law might
provide and exposed them to specialized forms of liability and punishment.82
Eventually, this persecution based on status entailed a disregard for any formal
determination of culpability; punishment, including death, became the legally
unmediated consequence of being of the wrong "race."
Although Neumann did not discuss double jeopardy, it also played an
important role in Nazi criminal justice. Contemporary scholars, including Ingo
Mueller and Mathew Lippman, show how, in the guise of "extraordinary
appeals" and the "nullity plea," double jeopardy was used to further extend the
power of the state over undesirable people and groups.
83
These devices were central to the development of a comprehensive juridical
program. Double jeopardy, as well as retroactive and status-based laws, provided
alternative ways of individualizing the law for authoritarian ends. More broadly,
the Nazi abrogation of rule of law norms formed part of a larger scheme keyed to
elevating "material justice" over formal rules, to overcoming the liberal
disjunction of law and morality, and to displacing a rational jurisprudence, of
which the rule of law constituted the clearest expression, with a legal system
84utterly subordinate to overtly politicized prerogatives of the sovereign. The
criminal law emerged as a means of "annihilating opposition," whatever this
77. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 20, at 293-94.
78. Id. at 294.
79. Kirchheimer, Criminal Law in National Socialist Germany, supra note 47, at 172-74.
80. Id at 173-74; NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH, supra note 25, at 456-57.
81. NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH, supra note 25, at 454-58.
82. Lippman, supra note 76, at 113-34.
83. MOLLER, supra note 76, at 129; Lippman, supra note 76, at 116.
84. Kirchheimer, Criminal Law in National Socialist Germany, supra note 47, at 173-74.
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required in the way of departure from "bourgeois" legal norms. 85  In this,
according to both Neumann and Kirchheimer, inhered a broader repudiation of
the rule of law construct and a practical and ideological program of
lawlessness-thinly concealed within the nominal framework of a legal system-
that would eventually subsume the entire social order.86
Underlying this account of the Nazi assault on the rule of law are two points
that bear closely on the topic of this article. First is the juridical ideology of the
Nazi abrogation of the rule of law. According to Neumann, this project drew on
a particularly disingenuous exercise in immanent critique, as reflected in the
work of the jurist Carl Schmitt. For Schmitt, along with other juridical
apologists of fascism, the process of destroying the rule of law was the
culmination of an attempt ostensibly to perfect the construct-to repair its
deficiencies and to save it (or at least its underlying norms) from the rule of law's
88own inner contradictions. Neumann describes the logic in this way:
The ideological technique of the new [Nazi] legal theory is clear, as always.
National Socialism takes advantage of the incompleteness of the liberal ideas of
freedom and equality. It charges that freedom and equality are cloaks behind which
exploitation is hidden. But National Socialism is out to destroy not the inequalities
but what little protection legal equality still offers.
89
Although Neumann was prepared to extract certain compromises from the rule
of law, for him, the implications of this critique of Nazi jurisprudence informed a
broad skepticism toward reckless, untimely, and opportunistic challenges to the
rule of law. This skepticism speaks to contemporary arguments that defend
habitual offender laws and other affronts to the rule of law by the ulterior logic of
pragmatism and instrumentalism.
Second, Neumann' appreciated the rule of law's unique vulnerability. While
modem scholars tend to describe the rule of law in either operational or
functional terms that reduce the construct to an amalgamation of independently
functional norms, Neumann sees it very differently. For him, the entire construct
revolves around the conjoined principles of legality and legal generality. 90 These
principles prefigure and conceptually anchor the rule of law's subsidiary
principles, like separation of powers and prospectivity, as well as its overall
normative program. When the rule of law is understood in this way, policies
based in double jeopardy, retroactivity, or status take on significance beyond
their immediate effect on a particular freedom or norm. Although their initial
effect is limited, such policies necessarily strike more deeply at the underlying
85. Lippman, supra note 76, at 132.
86. See Kirchheimer, supra note 47, at 173-74; Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law
in Modern Society, supra note 17, at 127-28.
87. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society, supra note 17, at 127-
28.
88. Id. at 132-38.
89. NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH, supra note 25, at 452.
90. See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
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principles of legality and legal generality, and consequently threaten the
conceptual coherence of the entire rule of law construct. For if legal generality
yields to accommodate retroactive laws, why should it not also yield to explicitly
individualized laws, or the circumvention of judicial independence, or even
outright lawlessness on the part of the state and its agents? If legality is set aside
for double jeopardy, why not also for the purpose of justifying outright
lawlessness? Indeed, how can the abrogation of either of these principles as
principles-with the resulting authorization of exceptional or individual rules
and general standards-be confined to any particular areas of law and
governance?
By this recognition of the inherent vulnerability of the rule of law project, and
not simply out of a fear of the inexorable tendencies toward fascism in liberal
society (a fear that does play a central role in Neumann's thought), Neumann
strikes a cautionary, protective tone regarding the sanctity of rule of law norms.9 1
The rule of law is not law; but it is, in what Neumann calls an ideological and
ethical sense, the juridical centerpiece of the liberal and social democratic legal
order.9 2  To view it in sacrificial, instrumentalist terms is very dangerous-
especially where the inherent disorder and conflict of modern society (and with
this criminality) inform a persistent tendency toward more extensive and
draconian means of control. In this light, the risk of eroding the rule of law can
be seen in the way it opens the door ideologically and juridically to the
development of authoritarian forms of governance.
This argument puts a finer point on traditional liberal arguments against
double jeopardy and retroactive and status-based laws. These arguments have
focused narrowly on the tendency of the first two types of laws to upset settled
expectations, to result in arbitrary effects, and to expose individuals and groups
to being singled out for punishment,9 3 and on the tendency of the latter to
increase the exposure of minorities or other politically weak groups to official
persecution. As far as they go, these criticisms are true enough. But, by
understanding the fate of these norms within a broader juridical narrative about
the rule of law, its vulnerability to internal corrosion, and its negative fate in the
rise of authoritarianism, Neumann invites a reflection on the deeper risks that
inhere in these limited affronts to the rule of law. By casting retroactivity and
status-based crimes in these perilous terms, and by stressing the role of ostensibly
"reformist" ideology in paving the way for the rule of law's destruction,
Neumann also offers a salient response to those who would justify double
jeopardy and retroactive and status-based laws as consistent with some greater
cause of justice.9 4
91. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society, supra note 17, at 13,
201.
92. Id.
93. HALL, supra note 37, at 61-64; Mathew P. Harrington, Forward: The Dual Dichotomy of
Retroactive Lawmaking, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 19, 29-30 (1997).
94. See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 37, at 53-54; Dan M. Kahan, Some Realism About
Retroactive Lawmaking, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 95, 97-103 (1997).
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Later, this article discusses the particular significance of Neumann's fears in
the context of habitual offender laws. Not only do these laws run afoul of the
rule of law on several specific grounds, they do so while advancing a broader
agenda of social control over the lower classes. Although this agenda has always
been central to criminal justice, the juridical form of habitual offender laws lends
it a qualitatively different, more punitive, and increasingly authoritarian
complexion.
II1. THE RULE OF LAW AND THE STRUCTURE OF HABITUAL OFFENDER LAWS
As Neumann recognized, and as anyone who sees the rule of law as more than
a metaphor for the status quo must also recognize, the construct's norms are
seldom found ingrained, unproblematically, in the political and legal realities of
modem society. They remain unrealized in the criminal justice context, perhaps
least of all with regard to habitual offender laws. In their various iterations, these
laws unavoidably contradict the rule of law. The courts have failed to rectify this
condition, and their repeated efforts to find these laws constitutional have also
exposed the depth of juridical infirmity of habitual offender laws.
This section analyzes this condition as it affects habitual offender laws. First,
this section offers a brief functional description of habitual offender laws.
Second, this section offers a critique of the courts' attempts to save these laws
from constitutional challenge. The courts' views of habitual offender laws are
shown to culminate in an appeal to the criminalization of status, by way of
punishment, which accords with lay justifications for these laws. This
jurisprudence discloses a broader juridical structure to habitual offender laws,
one mired in an inability to deny the double jeopardy, retroactive, and status-
based effects of such laws.
A. The Functional Structure of Habitual Offender Laws
Habitual offender laws are sentencing statutes that subject offenders to greater
punishment based on their prior criminal offenses. These laws have a long
history in American sentencing policy, first coming into play during colonial
times.95  Originally narrowly conceived and infrequently deployed, they
gradually became more common and more frequently used, especially in the96
early twentieth century. Habitual offender laws have become even more97
prominent over the last decade. During this time, almost every state, as well as
the federal government, either adopted some new, more punitive habitual
95. Evidently colonial habitual offender laws were limited by a tendency to require an identity
between the "qualifying" and the "triggering" offense. Beginning with New York's enactment in
1797 of the first habitual offender law, however, jurisdictions in the new republic began to supplant
these regimes with laws of broader application. Turner et al., supra note 1, at 17.
96. Nourse, supra note 1, at 930-32 app. A; Katkin, supra note 1, at 99-104. As these
authorities demonstrate, the extension of such laws was particularly pronounced in the 1920s.
97. CLARKETAL., supra note 1, at 1-2.
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offender sentencing regime, or reinforced its existing regime-not infrequently
with a three strikes law.
98
Habitual offender laws are not monolithic. They vary on a number of different
bases, including the definition of prior, or "qualifying," offenses and the
mechanism by which these offenses are made relevant to a current case. 99 In
addition, they vary by the so-called "triggering" offense required to activate the
habitual offender law.' 00 They vary as well by both the process for establishing,
and determining the magnitude of, the sentencing enhancement that attaches
upon conviction of the triggering offense.'0 ' With regard to the effect of
qualifying offenses, some jurisdictions designate a set number of offenses, or
"strikes," the commission of which mandates greater punishment. Other
jurisdictions ratchet up sentencing based on each qualifying offense, or require
that all prior offenses of a certain kind factor into sentencing. 10 2 Others increase
sentences based on the temporal proximity of qualifying offenses to the
triggering offense.' 
03
Historically, some jurisdictions required that a qualifying offense resulted in
actual imprisonment. However, under most modem regimes, a simple conviction
on the qualifying offense is the relevant criterion. ' 4  In addition, similar
variations characterize the way jurisdictions denominate qualifying offenses in
the first place. In some jurisdictions, a narrower list of qualifying offenses
applies--one that usually focuses on violent or dangerous felonies.10  In other
98. Three strikes laws tended to piggy-back onto existing habitual offender laws-in some
instances doing more to change the language of the earlier laws than their effects. CLARK ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 7-11. For an overview of the resulting regimes and their dates of enactment, see
e.g., DAvID B. ROTMAN ET AL., STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 1998, at 289-93 tbl. 44 (Bureau of
Justice Statistics ed., 2000) (1998); 1996 NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE SENTENCING STRUCTURES
16-17 (Bureau of Justice Statistics ed., 1998).




103. See, e.g., id.; SCHIRALDI ET AL., supra note 4, at 13-16 (describing variations among three
strikes regimes). One might actually posit a spectrum of habitual offender regimes on this axis of
the particular mechanism by which habitual offender status imposes an enhanced sentence. At one
end of the spectrum are those regimes, like three strikes laws, that impose greater sentences in
accordance with a relatively rigid, formalized mechanism. At the other extreme are, for example,
sentencing guidelines as well as discretionary judicial sentencing processes, which give prior
convictions (or even unproven changes) enhancing effect, but in a more complicated and often less
formal fashion. On the habitual offender functions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4Bl.1 (2004). Cf 28 U.S.C.S. § 994(h) (2005) (requiring
Federal Sentencing Commission to incorporate habitual offender effects into the Sentencing
Guidelines).
104. See, e.g., ROTTMAN ET AL., supra note 98, at 289-93 tbl. 44; CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at
7-9. Maryland and Tennessee retain a prior imprisonment requirement. Another major point of
variation among states in this context is whether the qualifying offenses, if more than one is
required, must be sequential or litigated independently of the triggering offense. The courts regard
this as a matter of statutory construction and legislative intent. See, e.g., Bover v. State, 797 So. 2d
1246, 1250 (Fla. 2001).
105. See, e.g., ROTTMAN ET AL., supra note 98, at 289-93 tbl. 44.
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jurisdictions, any prior felonies, whether violent or not (and in some cases, even
misdemeanors), will activate the habitual offender provisions.' 0 6 In any case, the
actual procedures for determining habitual offender status on these bases are
often quite complicated.10 7 A similar complexity characterizes the way triggering
offenses are sorted out. Most jurisdictions use a defined list of felony qualifying
offenses.'08 However, in some jurisdictions, the triggering offense must be of the
same kind as the qualifying offense in order to activate the habitual offender
regime. In yet others, any felony (sometimes even a misdemeanor) will suffice,
regardless of its lack of similarity to the qualifying offense.
In every jurisdiction, habitual offender laws function within the sentencing
process. 19 Specifically, a habitual offender determination does not represent a
separate form of liability or a separate crime in any formal sense. Rather,
habitual offender laws ascribe a status to offenders that recommends-in most
jurisdictions, mandates-the imposition of a more severe sentence than the
offender would otherwise receive for any of the relevant offenses alone.
Nominally, this sentence attaches to the triggering offense, hence the concept of
enhancement. At least, that is how these laws have been justified.
The magnitude of this enhancement varies considerably. The most severe
effect, which is not uncommon, is to impose on a habitual offender a mandatory
sentence of life imprisonment, often without the possibility of discretionary
release. This is characteristic of many contemporary three strikes laws." 0 In
other instances, the enhancement effect is somewhat less severe and, to some
degree, more discretionary. Typical outcomes include an incremental increase in
the sentence in accordance with some type of sentencing guideline, mandatory
imposition of the maximum sentence for the conviction offense, the resort to a
mathematical formula for increasing the default sentence, an open-ended
106. See, e.g., id; Beres & Griffith, Criminal Incapacitation, supra note 4, at 110.
107. The California three strikes regime is especially complicated-and especially punitive.
California's law features both a two strike and a three strike provision. Qualifying felonies must
generally be of a particular class, but any felony may serve as a triggering offense. Moreover,
under this regime, prior felonies convicted or pleaded together do not "merge" and may be
considered separately for enhancement purposes. See, e.g., CAL. DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N,
PROSECUTORS' PERSPECTIVE ON CALIFORNIA's THREE STRIKES LAW: A 10-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 2-3
(2004), available at http://www.threestrikes.org/ThreeStrikes.pdf; FRANKLIN ZIMRING ET AL.,
PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 7-11, 17-28
(2001). Under California law, certain crimes, called "wobblers," may be treated as either felonies
or misdemeanors, at the discretion of prosecutors and judges. This allows misdemeanor-type
offenses to factor into habitual offender prosecutions. CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 (Deering 1998);
Loren Gordon, Where to Commit a Crime if You Can Only Spare a Few Days to Serve the Time:
The Constitutionality of California 's Wobbler Statutes as Applied in the State Today, 33 S.W.U. L.
REv. 497 (2004).
108. See TURNER ET AL., supra note 1, at 17. This requirement of an identity between the
qualifying and the triggering offense was a traditional feature of habitual offender laws which has
not been largely abrogated, especially by three strikes laws. On other variations in the definition of
qualifying offenses, see also CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at 7-9. California is the most explicit in
its use of any prior felony as a qualifying offense. Id.
109. See TURNER ET AL., supra note 1, at 33.
110. Beres & Griffith, Criminal Incapacitation, supra note 4, at 110.
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injunction to the sentencing authority to increase the defendant's sentence, or the
addition of some set number of years of incarceration."1
B. The Juridical Structure of Habitual Offender Laws
As suggested at the outset of this article, habitual offender laws have attracted
considerable scholarly criticism. Many critics focus on the perverse policy
implications of these laws. They point out grossly unjust results in particular
cases, as well as the uncertain ability of these laws to consistently advance their
stated goals of enhanced public safety and increased retribution. 12 In this view,
habitual offender laws waste money, time, and human life itself in an unrealized
quest for safety and moral exactitude." 3 By their very nature, such critiques say
little about the juridical structure of habitual offender laws. However, they do
have great value in pointing out the social and political effects that accompany
these laws' juridical structure.
Other critics focus on, in the narrow sense of the word, the jurisprudential
implications of habitual offender laws. These critics invariably weigh habitual
offender laws against constitutional doctrines. Rejecting as ill-founded the
courts' consistent endorsement of habitual offender laws, they argue that such
laws violate equal protection, due process, separation of powers, the Double
Jeopardy, Ex Post Facto, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses."
14
Insofar as such critiques expose the courts' contradictory reasoning, and the room
that the doctrines leave for a closer adherence to rule of law norms, they too
provide a valuable service to the current critique.
However, such constitutional critiques are not truly juridical. Although
constitutional arguments invariably touch on the juridical implications of these
laws, they do not directly or entirely grasp this matter. Significantly, the
Constitution itself does not fully and unproblematically embrace the rule of law
construct or its underlying concerns about the limits of sovereignty. With the
Constitution, such concerns are circumscribed and attenuated, first by its own
text, and ultimately by the courts' interpretations of that text. By embracing the
narrative of constitutional meaning that has emerged from this process,
jurisprudential critiques of habitual offender laws invariably ignore many of the
questions that the rule of law poses about the nature of the state's assertions of
power in this context. 15
111. ROTrMAN ET AL., supra note 98, at 289-93 tbl. 44.
112. See Vitiello, supra note 3, at 1066-68; Marvell & Moody, supra note 4, at 102-05.
113. See, e.g., ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4; ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 100-27;
Vitiello, supra note 3, at 1071-96; Marvell & Moody, supra note 4, at 106; Males & Macallair,
supra note 34, at 68; Beres & Griffith, Criminal Incapacitation, supra note 4, at 138; Beres &
Griffith, Drop in California Crime?, supra note 4, at 130-31; Roger, supra note 3, at 164-65.
114. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 4; Coonen, supra note 6, at 84-85; Heller, supra
note 6, at 2048; Seltzer, supra note 6, at 929.
115. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 6; Coonen, supra note 6; Heller, supra note 6;
Seltzer, supra note 6.
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As a result of these dynamics, an attempt to pin down the juridical structure of
habitual offender laws requires a fresh critique of their legal structures and
implications. To some extent, this is satisfied by a review of the outermost
structure of such laws. In other respects, though, it benefits from a review of the
many judicial opinions upholding these laws against constitutional challenge. A
review of the jurisprudence on habitual offender laws shows that the courts have
had to confront these statutes' double jeopardy and retroactive effects, and the
apparent inconsistency between these effects and the Double Jeopardy and Ex
Post Facto clauses of the Constitution. In saving habitual offender laws from the
seemingly critical implications of these constitutional doctrines, courts have
recast habitual offender laws as status-based, and with that, exposed yet another
juridical failing in habitual offender liability. In fact, these cases follow a
relatively consistent pattern of acknowledging (by a certain kind of doctrinal
denial) the double jeopardy and retroactive tendencies inherent in these laws,
while embracing their function as status-based laws. 11
6
Of these threshold constitutional problems, the double jeopardy issue is the
more ubiquitous. It follows from the fact that enhancement of punishment that
appertains to these laws appears very much as a mechanism for punishing the
defendant a second time for the qualifying offense(s). In other words, the
marginal increase in punishment above that normally following the triggering
offense, which is what enhancement really reflects, can be seen as a thinly veiled
attempt to punish again the qualifying offense. This same dynamic sometimes
presents a retroactivity problem where the habitual offender statute was adopted
after the defendant committed or was convicted of the qualifying offense. In
other words, to the extent that a habitual offender law actually punishes the
qualifying offense, it often does so retroactively.
By the early nineteenth century, just as confinement in the penitentiary began
to emerge as a common means of punishment,' 17 a number of states adopted
serious habitual offender laws, and their courts were asked to confront the
constitutional implications of these laws. The resulting decisions established a
jurisprudence and juridical framework for dealing with habitual offender laws
that continues to hold sway, surviving even the Warren Court reforms of the mid-
and late-twentieth century intact." 8
116. Of course the list of apparent constitutional difficulties inherent in habitual offender laws
includes more than problems of double jeopardy, retroactivity, and status (and their associated
constitutional doctrines: the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses, and an interpretation of
due process laws). Cruel and unusual punishment claims have been prominent; as have equal
protection, separation of powers, and other kinds of due process arguments. Whatever might be the
strongest or most interesting constitutional arguments, though, the concern here is with the juridical
standing of habitual offender laws. And in this connection the most significant issues are clearly
those that revolve around double jeopardy, retroactivity, and status.
117. On the origins of the prison in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century America, see
generally, MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN: THE PENITENTIARY IN THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION, 1750-1850 (1978); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL
ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1971).
118. See Richard S. Frase, The Warren Court Criminal Justice Revolution: Reflections a
Generation Later: The Warren Court's Missed Opportunities in Substantive Criminal Law, 3 OHIO
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Inevitably, these early cases were state court decisions. Perhaps the most
important was Ross' Case,'19 a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision in
1824. After New York, Massachusetts was the first state to adopt a serious
habitual offender law, in 1804, and to rigorously enforce it. The Commonwealth
imposed a version of this law on two defendants, William Ross and William
Riley, who then challenged the statute on various constitutional grounds,
including its retroactive use of their prior convictions as qualifying offenses.'
2 0
The court rejected the ex post facto claim.' 2 It did so by finding the basis of the
law's enhancing effect in the triggering statute-and not in the qualifying
statute.122  By this logic, the defendants were not punished "anew" and the
habitual offender law could not be deemed retroactive. The law simply used "the
character of the culprit" as a basis for enhancing punishment for committing the
triggering offense. The punishment, the court said, "is for the last offence
committed, and it is rendered more severe in consequence of the situation into
which the party had previously brought himself."'
123
The Massachusetts courts continued to follow this approach in the context of
ex post facto challenges. They extended it to a double jeopardy claim a few
years later in Plumbly v. Commonwealth.14  In rejecting the claim that
Massachusetts' habitual offender laws-which by the court's reasoning had
already become "somewhat numerous and complicated.-"impose[d] a second
punishment for the same offence," the court instead held that these laws only
enhanced the punishment for the triggering offense. 25 It lent this mechanism a
practical, utilitarian justification: "that the former punishment has been
inefficacious in doing the work of reform for which it was designated."'1
26
This reasoning was widely followed and expanded upon by other nineteenth
century state courts. For example, in Rand v. Commonwealth, the Virginia
ST. J. CRIM. L. 75, 79 (2005).
119. 19Mass. 165 (1824).
120. As is typical of these early cases, the exact constitutional bases of the defendants' claims
are not clear. It appears that the defendants' retroactivity claims were founded in both the U.S.
Constitution and the Massachusetts Constitution, as well as more or less general principles of
criminal and constitutional law. Cases of William Ross & William Riley, 19 Mass. 165 (1824).
121. Id. at 171.
122. Id.
123. Id. Among other claims confronted by the court was that the procedure for establishing
habitual offender status circumvented the right to a jury trial. The court disposed of this claim by
averring to the fact that the culpability for the qualifying offenses used in the proceeding had
previously been established by jury trial. Id.
124. 43 Mass. 413 (1841).
125. Id. at415.
126. Id. The source of the double jeopardy claim in Plumbly is not made clear. Presumably it
was founded on the Massachusetts Constitution, for the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution would not be clearly and unequivocally incorporated against
the states until well into the twentieth century. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-96
(1969) (incorporating the Double Jeopardy Clause against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause). Cf Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (limiting the
incorporation of double jeopardy principles against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause).
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Supreme Court of Appeals rejected a retroactivity challenge to that state's
habitual offender law by invoking Ross' logic of tying the enhanced punishment
to the triggering offense while stressing the relevance of the qualifying offense as
a measure of the defendant's status, or in the words of this court, his "moral
depravity."' 127 In 1872, the California Supreme Court resolved a double jeopardy
challenge to its habitual offender law-that the "accused [would] be twice
punished for the first offense"--in similar terms. 128 Invoking Rand and Ross, the
court noted:
The ready answer to that proposition is, that he is not again punished for the first
offense, but the punishment for the second is increased, because of his persistence
in the perpetration of crime he has evinced a depravity, which merits a greater
punishment, and needs to be retrained by severed penalties than if it were his first
offense.
129
By the latter part of the nineteenth century, state supreme courts took the
authority of Ross' reasoning for granted. They regularly turned back both double
jeopardy and retroactivity challenges to habitual offender laws without much
comment beyond a citation to the earlier cases, and perhaps a brief recitation of
the logic of recasting habitual offender sentencing as a matter of using qualifying
offenses to inform status-based sentencing for triggering offenses. 130 Only in rare
instances did courts hesitate before embracing this jurisprudence. The 1893 case
of a thief who received a life sentence under Ohio's habitual offender law for
stealing $14.80 worth of chickens did give that state's supreme court pause. In
Blackburn v. State, the court described the defendant's ex post facto claim as
"not without plausibility," and it acknowledged that the qualifying conviction
was a "necessary factor" in the defendant's subsequent punishment and thus not
so easily disregarded for double jeopardy purposes.'13 Even so, the court deemed
this necessity insufficient to render the scheme unconstitutional, as the legal
effect of the earlier conviction was "simply to advance him towards that class of
offenders" that the law made subject to more severe penalties when they
committed the triggering offense.
132
By the end of the nineteenth century, Ross' reasoning was no longer
questioned by state courts. It was also embraced by the federal courts. In 1895
in Moore v. Missouri, the United States Supreme Court upheld a Missouri
habitual offender law that resulted in a life sentence for a combination of larceny
and burglary convictions. Quoting Ross and other earlier state court decisions,
127. Rand v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. 738, 743-45 (1852).
128. People v. Stanley, 47 Cal. 113, 116 (1873).
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Sturtevant v. Commonwealth, 33 N.E. 648, 649 (Mass. 1893); Commonwealth v.
Marchand, 29 N.E. 578, 578 (Mass. 1891); Kelley v. People, 4 N.E. 644, 646 (I11. 886); Ingalls v.
Wisconsin, 4 N.W. 785, 794 (Wis. 1880); Maguire v. Maryland, 47 Md. 485, 496 (1878); Ex Parte
Gutierrez, 45 Cal. 429, 432-33 (1873).
131. Blackburn v. State, 36 N.E. 18, 21 (Ohio 1893).
132. Id. at 20.
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the Court concluded that it was "quite impossible" to sustain a double jeopardy
challenge to the statute. 133 Interestingly, the Court seemed to accept the view that
the federal Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause applied to the case. 1
34
In the twentieth century, the Court deepened its commitment to this
jurisprudence. For example, in 1901, in McDonald v. Massachusetts, the Court,
again citing the early cases, upheld a habitual offender law against both double
jeopardy and retroactivity challenges.135 For the McDonald majority, the statute
could not impose double jeopardy and could not be seen as retroactive because
the "punishment is for the new [triggering] crime only, [which] is heavier if he is
an habitual offender."'1 36 Likewise, "the allegation of previous convictions is not
a distinct charge of crimes, but is necessary to bring the case within the [habitual
offender] statute, and goes to punishment only.' 37  In several other early
twentieth century cases, the Court demonstrated its continued adherence to this
jurisprudence. 38 By 1948, the Court, in Gryger v. Burke, was content simply to
cite its earlier precedent, as well as the even earlier state supreme court cases, to
deflect such challenges. 39 By 1962, in Oyler v. Boles, the Court tersely declared
that the constitutionality of habitual offender laws was "no longer open to serious
challenge."'
140
The law on this issue remains fixed on the logic first announced in Ross' Case,
with courts routinely summoning up its logic to turn back double jeopardy and ex
post facto challenges to habitual offender laws.' 4 ' In 1998, the Court went so far
133. Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 677 (1895).
134. The Court seems to take this point for granted, without speaking directly to the question of
incorporation or the like. Moore, 159 U.S. at 677. Also interesting is that the Court in Moore
considered and rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to the law. Id. The Missouri Supreme
Court decision makes clear that the defendant based these claims in the U.S. Constitution. State v.
Moore, 26 S.W. 345, 346 (Mo. 1894). The matter of incorporation of basic double jeopardy
doctrine was not clearly settled until the mid-twentieth century. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784, 795 (1969). The vast majority of state constitutions have, however, always contained
double jeopardy provisions. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 154 n.9 (1959) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
135. 180U.S.311 (1901).
136. Id. at 312.
137. Id. at 313.
138. For example, in Graham v. West Virginia, the Court rejected a double jeopardy challenge
to a West Virginia law that converted a defendant's five-year grand larceny sentence to a life
sentence. In rejecting this claim, the Court invoked the long-settled practice of using habitual
offender laws, as well as the equally long-standing habit of courts upholding them. Graham v.
West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623, 627 (1912). The Court in Graham also rejected a cruel and
unusual punishment challenge, as well as challenges based inadequacy of process and equal
protection claims. Id. at 631. See also Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51, 59 (1914) (relying on
McDonald to uphold New York habitual offender law against double jeopardy challenge).
139. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948).
140. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 451 (1962). See also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559
(1967) (upholding recidivist statute against various challenges including double jeopardy and ex
post facto claims).
141. On this mode of rejecting double jeopardy and ex post facto challenges, see, e.g., United
States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1997); Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 399-400
(1995); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 717 (1994); United States v. Kaluna, 152 F.3d
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as to hold the Double Jeopardy Clause inapplicable to habitual offender
proceedings even when the challenge was directed at a prosecutorial appeal of a
prior determination that the defendant had not committed the qualifying
offense. 142 To the extent they continue to question the notion of habitual offender
liability, rather than the procedures by which it is established, contemporary
challenges to three strikes laws and other modem versions of habitual offender
laws have focused on cruel and unusual punishment arguments, which the courts
have ultimately rejected as well. 1
43
In summary, the jurisprudential framework that emerges from these cases
consists of three main themes. First, the relevance of habitual offender laws is
located in the triggering offense; the habitual offender law is styled as a means of
enhancing the punishment that attends this later offense. Second, the habitual
offender law is held not to create any new offense. As the cases demonstrate, by
these two claims the courts are able to simultaneously deny that the effects of
habitual offender laws are retroactive and to deny that they create a new offense
or a new punishment for an already-punished act. The former reasoning disposes
of any claims under the Ex Post Facto Clause; while the latter deals with the
double jeopardy problem. Even here, the appeal to status shifts the locus of
punishment from the triggering offense-where life in prison for a minor theft
offense might seem quite excessive-to the overall criminal history of the
offender.'
44
A third theme of this reasoning-something clearly evident in the cases-is an
explicit reduction of the logic of habitual offender laws to punishment on the
basis of status; or as Ross' noted, the "character of the culprit" is made the
relevant factor. 145 The justifications behind this revolve around extending the
criminal law's reach over offenders who have supposedly proven difficult to
reform or deter, and further punishing those who seem resistant to moral
correction.
Recasting the issue in terms of status is not, as the courts have found,
constitutionally problematic. Despite a few important cases suggesting
1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Washington, 109 F.3d 335, 338 (7th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Rasco, 123 F.3d 222, 227 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Dittrich, 100 F.3d 84, 87 (8th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836, 840-41 (8th Cir. 1996).
142. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 734 (1998). The upshot of the Court's decision in this
case was to hold the Double Jeopardy Clause inapplicable to sentencing outside of the capital
punishment context. Id. See also People v. Barragan, 83 P.3d 480, 484 (Cal. 2004).
143. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,
71-77 (2003); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980).
144. Such reasoning is central to the Court's exercise in upholding California's three strikes
laws against Eighth Amendment challenge in Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29-30 (2003).
Although the double jeopardy issue was not central to the Court's ultimate reasoning ruling in
Ewing, the issue was raised by the litigants. Those urging the Court to uphold the three strikes law
against double jeopardy challenge invoked the traditional logic of recasting the three strikes law as
a status-based sentencing regime. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Ewing v.
California Supporting Respondent at 14, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (No. 01-6978).
145. In re Ross, 19 Mass. 165, 171 (1824).
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constitutional limits on the criminalization of status,14 6 courts have never adopted
a strong or consistent opposition to such laws. 147 More troubling, courts have
never interpreted their opposition to status crimes to encompass the use of status
in sentencing even where, as with habitual offender laws, the relevant status
might have an effect on sentencing that far transcends that of the culpable
behavior incidental to the triggering offense, where the effect is typically
automatic, and where the relevant status is deduced simply from prior criminal
convictions with no further nuance to the inquiry. It is precisely this
jurisprudence that accommodates the courts' rearticulation of double jeopardy
and retroactivity concerns as issues of status.
Again, the Constitution is one thing-in fact, only what the courts say it is.
Juridical norms are quite another. In the latter respect, the appeal to status is
problematic. Significantly, on one level, this move only recasts and circumvents
the double jeopardy and retroactivity problems that inhabit these laws; it does not
alter the realities that create these problems in the first place. The qualifying
offense is not only a "necessary factor," as the Ohio Supreme Court noted in
Blackburn; it is the only relevant factor in creating often enormous marginal
increases in punishment and effective liability. 48 Notwithstanding the courts'
manipulative reasoning, the double jeopardy and retroactive effects of these
statutes are undeniable for those subject to them. In this sense, it is difficult to
accept the idea that calling the qualifying offense a sentencing factor really
obviates the problems of retroactivity and double jeopardy. Also, in this sense,
the entire jurisprudence of habitual offender laws on questions of double
jeopardy and retroactivity can be viewed as a formalistic and legalistic ruse.
Similarly, it is not clear whether the courts' refusal to apply status-crime
jurisprudence to sentencing is judicially well-founded. This is particularly true
where the issues of status used in sentencing extend far beyond the crime for
which the defendant is ostensibly being sentenced. Certainly, the same rule of
law-based concerns that disfavor the outright criminalization of status-the
inherent threat to legal generality and its ancillary norms and the concomitant
ability of the state to use this mechanism to individuate its sovereign power-are
just as operative where status is used in punishment. In fact, they may be more
operative at the point where punishment is actually imposed. Again, in this
context it is not simply that status is made relevant to punishment; with habitual
offender laws status is completely decisive without any rational inquiry into the
146. The high-water mark in this jurisprudence is Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962),
in which the Court invalidated a statute that criminalized, among other things, the condition of
being a drug addict. Although sounding themes more reminiscent of due process jurisprudence, the
court actually rested the case on the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Id. at 666. See also
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (invalidating on diffuse due process grounds a statute
criminalizing passive conduct and devoid of any clear mens rea requirement).
147. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 521-25, 528-31 (1968) (rejecting the argument that a
conviction for the crime of public drunkenness was an unconstitutional status crime and stressing
the fact that a voluntary act, however minimal, could be discerned in the defendant's conduct).
148. Blackburn v. State, 36 N.E. 18, 21 (Ohio 1893).
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circumstances of the prior conviction. 149 In other words, there seems to be no
functional difference between giving the status of being a criminal enormous
marginal relevance in sentencing, as is the case with habitual offender laws, and
embracing more forthrightly that these statutes make it a crime to be a criminal.
If there is any functional difference at all, it is that the application to sentencing
avails the defendant of fewer rights (e.g., regarding non-retroactivity) than the
application to liability as such, and is for this reason all the more troubling.
With this view of habitual offender laws as status-based punishment regimes,
the courts merely embrace the usual justification for these laws among lay
commentators, scholars, and politicians. Proponents in these circles speak of
habitual offender laws as a way of punishing or deterring "career criminals," or
of accommodating people who have proven themselves incapable of living in
"civilized" society. l  For them, "criminals" are a special category of people
deserving of extra-special punishment beyond that which normally appertains to
the commitment of a particular crime. As one critic of California's three strikes
law notes, "[i]n the rhetoric of the campaign [to adopt the enacting proposition],
the subjects of Three Strikes laws were always objectified as criminals. At best
they were felons, repeat offenders. More often they were predators or 'dirtbags.'
Never did they have a human identity beyond their criminal record.'
' 5 1
Accordingly, the California District Attorneys Association, in amicus briefs
urging the Supreme Court to uphold that state's three strikes laws, variously
described the defendants in those cases, as well as three strikes offenders
149. I do not take up the question in this article, whether prior convictions or other indicia of
"character" should ever be used in sentencing. Suffice to say that while the argument advanced
here speaks most pointedly to the kind of automatic, formal, and un-nuanced use of such factors in
habitual offender sentencing, its overall tenor is adverse to the very idea of sentencing
"enhancement" based on factors besides those evident in the crime of conviction.
150. See, e.g., Kent Scheidegger & Michael Rushford, The Social Benefits of Confining
Habitual Offenders, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 59, 62 (1999); James A. Ardaiz, California's Three
Strikes Law: History, Expectations, Consequences, 32 McGEORGE L. REV. 1, 3-7 (2000); Bill
Jones, Why the Three Strikes Law is Working in California, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 24-26
(1999); Fox Butterfield, A Prosecutor Who Has Felt the Pain of a Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
1995, at B 11 (describing prosecutor-crime victim who touts the merits of federal three strikes law).
151. Samuel H. Pillsbury, A Problem of Emotive Due Process: California 's Three Strikes Law,
6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 483, 515 (2002) (citation omitted). Similarly, the Ballot Pamphlet for
California Proposition 184, by which the state reaffirmed its 1994 three strikes law, is laden with
arguments about incapacitating "career criminals, who rape women, molest innocent children and
commit murder" and saving taxpayers money by avoiding the "outrageous costs of running career
criminals through the judicial system's revolving door over and over again." CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE,
CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION 1994, at 36 (Nov. 8, 1994). The California
District Attorneys Association in its retrospective on the state's ten years of experience with its
three strikes law not only provides a selective list of habitual offenders sentenced under the law,
which predictably highlights their apparently dangerous characters; the document also touts the
law's supposed effect in changing California from a "net importer" to a "net exporter of felony
parolees." PROSECUTORS' PERSPECTIVE ON CALIFORNIA'S THREE STRIKES LAW, supra note 107, at
19. To make this point another way, habitual offender laws are clearly couched in the language and
the political logic of preventative detention. See generally Paul H. Robins, Punishing
Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1459
(2001).
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generally, as "the most thick skulled and predictably wicked felons," "predictably
felonious," "scoundrels," and "bad" people. Perhaps even more candidly than
the Court (or courts), the Association argues that under habitual offender laws,
general criminality is and should be the most decisive grounds for sentencing.
152
The State of California itself recently argued that the defendants in these cases
are "incorrigible" and have "manifested an imperviousness to deterrence that
poses a significant danger to society, no matter how trivial the triggering
offense."
'1 53
In fact, so pervasive is the view of habitual offender laws as a means of
identifying and removing from society undesirable people who have not been
filtered out by normal criminal sanctions, that it also characterizes some attempts
to critique this type of punishment. Many critics of habitual offender laws accept
the underlying logic of punishment based on proven incorrigibility or inherent
criminality; they merely note that in some cases the logic is arbitrarily applied, or
applied to the wrong people.
154
The problematic character of these laws is not evident in their abstract juridical
complexion or in their harsh effects in a particular case. Rather, the pervasive
problem with habitual offender laws concerns the connection between their
juridical structure, with its authoritarian implications, and the real-life program of
social control in which the criminal law and the criminal justice system are
substantially engaged. As the next section of this article demonstrates, the
juridical perils of these laws are manifest in their qualitative expansion of the
state's social control functions, culminating in a particularly pernicious, localized
authoritarianism with ominous implications for the emerging role of the state in
modern society.
IV. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AUTHORITARIAN SOCIAL CONTROL
To the extent that the rule of law is based in principles of legality and legal
generality, the overall juridical program of habitual offender laws is inconsistent
with the rule of law. This inconsistency reveals in habitual offender laws, in
particular in the proliferation of severe versions of the laws over the last decade
152. Brief on the Merits of Amicus Curiae California District Attorneys Association at 6, 28,
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (No. 01-6978); Brief on the Merits of Amicus Curiae
California District Attorneys Association at 29-30, Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (No.
01-1127).
153. Brief for the Petitioner at 14-15, 23, Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 38 (2003) (No. 01-
1127). See also Brief for the Respondent at 13-14, Ewing v. California, 511 U.S. 11 (2003) (No.
01-6978).
154. See, e.g., Vitiello, Reforming Three Strikes' Excesses, supra note 5; Roger, supra note 3.
This sense is evident among those who propose to reform California's three strikes law; many of
these figures initially supported them measure but now regard it as excessively punitive and costly.
See, e.g., Joe Domanick, They Changed Their Minds on Three Strikes, Can They Change the
Voters'?, L.A. TIMEs MAG., Sept. 19, 2004, at 10; Megan Garvey, Initiative Fight Puts Focus on
Felons, L.A. TnES, Sept. 27, 2004, at B 1; Lynda Gledhill, Amending '3-Strikes' Law has Voter
Support, Poll Finds: Only Serious Crimes Would Count in Tally, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 14, 2004, at
B3.
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or so, a juridical tendency consistent with the emergence of authoritarian social
control and one that is suited to the social realities of contemporary America.
This dynamic plays out on two levels, one ideological and jurisprudential, and
the other more practical.
Ideologically, the problem is that habitual offender laws discredit the very
concept of a rule of law at a time when that concept struggles to retain influence
and integrity. Habitual offender laws themselves are an abiding affront to the
rule of law; their double jeopardy, retroactive, and status-based features clash
with its core ideals. In upholding these statutes notwithstanding these juridical
features, courts not only eviscerate the constitutional prohibitions on double
jeopardy, retroactivity, and status-based laws by means of formalized, technical,
and unprincipled readings; they also inaugurate a broader jurisprudential
framework-a juridical ideology-that debases the rule of law, reducing it to
either vacuous rhetoric, or to precepts shorn of any fidelity to its erstwhile central
norms of legal generality and legality and its core mission of rationalizing
sovereignty. In this is a normalization of a debased notion of rule of law that has
long struggled to realize its normative claims.
This unfortunate juridical vision also presents itself in the courts' habits of
upholding other, more novel efforts to expand the temporal and substantive
boundaries of criminal sanction. Regimes that have benefited from this
perspective include sexual offender registration programs and sexual offender
civil commitment programs. These programs impose onerous, potentially
permanent sanctions on groups of individuals who are all but completely lacking
in political standing. 155 Reflecting an increasingly generalized contempt for the
rule of law, contemporary courts have had no problem side-stepping these
regimes' double eopardy and retroactive effects simply by deeming the sanctions
"non-punitive."1 6 That the courts have so thoroughly insulated these schemes
from constitutional challenge despite their apparent incompatibility with basic
constitutional norms indicates both the wider relevance of a habitual offender
jurisprudence that formalizes and trivializes these norms, and the real threat of a
continuing erosion of rule of law norms in the interests of expanded state power
that is embedded in this kind of jurisprudence. Simply put, a judiciary that can
so easily ignore the rule of law affronts of habitual offender laws, even where
these involve obvious constitutional problems, gives itself every reason to ignore
the same kinds of concern in any other context.
155. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 90-91 (2003) (describing Alaska's sexual offender
registration act).
156. The courts have upheld these regimes against double jeopardy and ex post facto challenges
primarily by deeming the sanction non-punitive. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003)
(upholding sexual offender registration scheme); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)
(upholding sexual offender registration scheme). For more on this jurisprudence, see generally
Stephen R. McAllister, "Neighbors Beware": The Constitutionality of State Sex Offer Registration
and Community Notification Laws, 29 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 97, 111-30 (1998); Anne C. Gillespie,
Note, Constitutional Challenges to Civil Commitment Law: An Uphill Battle for Sexual Predators
after Kansas v. Hendricks, 47 CAT. U. L. REv. 1145 (1998).
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Habitual offender laws, like sexual offender statutes, and like any expansion of
state sovereignty, are invariably the result of deeper social phenomena. Ideology
and jurisprudence alone can hardly wield decisive influence in the overall
process of social change. But, as many have noted, they do have a limited
autonomy, evident in an ability to rationalize, justify, inspire, and steer the course
of more fundamental developments. 157  As this article discussed above,
Neumann's concerns about the relationship between the rule of law and fascism
seemed rooted in exactly this view of the law's relative autonomy. In light of
this ability of jurisprudence and juridical ideology to assert a significance beyond
their points of origin, one should wonder where this juridical ideology will
surface next to justify the erosion of rule of law norms, and whether this
jurisprudence portends the evolution of a criminal justice jurisprudence that, in
the interests of "justice," is oblivious to rule of law concerns.
The troubling concept of sovereignty embodied in habitual offender laws
reflects itself in more immediate and practical ways. With these laws, the state
essentially arrogates to itself the right to cast criminality, and with this, the
parameters of its license to assert its most salient powers of coercion, as a matter
of status. Criminality is keyed to the phenomenological condition of being a
criminal type. In this scheme, particular acts or transactions are reduced from
forming the essential basis of criminal liability and the boundary of criminal
sanction to merely providing a mechanism for confirming such a condition. With
habitual offender laws, the state can assert this prerogative both retroactively and
cumulatively. Invariably, too, this assertion is not a foible of state power as such.
Rather, it reflects the influence of particular social realities and, with this, a
specific social and political program.
Although a full accounting of the social conditions that led to the recent
proliferation and intensification of habitual offender laws is largely beyond the
scope of this article, this issue is relevant to a discussion of the practical subtexts
of habitual offender laws and their authoritarian implications. Habitual offender
laws do not merely represent bad jurisprudence that invites courts and other
officials to think in more reckless ways about the limits of sovereignty. More
than this, their practical intensification and qualitative expansion of social control
functions are part of a social control agenda. Focused on the most marginalized
groups-the poor, the unemployed and underemployed, and racial minorities-
such an agenda has always been an important feature of modern criminal justice.
Social control in this sense entails several functions: the regulation of the spatial
distribution of marginalized people; their coercion into submitting to prevailing
structures of property and modes of labor discipline; the justification of authority,
hierarchy, and inequality under capitalism; and a general agenda of political
repression of class or group dissent.158 The essence of this social control project,
157. This sense is evident with Marx himself, for whom law, although ultimately predetermined
by economic forces, nonetheless retained a limited independent significance to the question of
social revolution. Marx, supra note 70, at 46-64. See also Isaac Balbus, Commodity Form and
Legal Form: An Essay on the Relative Autonomy of the Law, 11 L. & Soc'Y REv. 571 (1977).
158. On the critical deployment of this concept in various contexts of the criminal justice
system, see, e.g., MARK NEOCLEOUS, THE FABRICATION OF SOCIAL ORDER: A CRITICAL THEORY OF
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though, is the more straightforward (not to mention, apparently more legitimate)
logic of containing the threats of disorder and criminality that inhere, both in fact
and by perception, in these "dangerous" classes. 
159
By its very nature, this project is laden with authoritarian tendencies and is in
constant conflict with the very idea of a rule of law. While the rule of law is
fundamentally concerned with subordinating sovereignty to law and to legal
process, as prefigured by the principles of legality and legal generality, the
project of social control under the criminal law presupposes discretionary, in-
egalitarian, and otherwise ungoverned assertions of state power of an intensely
coercive sort.1 60  While the rule of law's own ideological functions lend
themselves to a certain legitimation of the criminal law, which no doubt abets its
social control function, a criminal justice system that is scrupulously faithful to
rule of law norms simply cannot efficiently accomplish the array of functions that
constitute the project of social control. This causes a tension between the rule of
law and the project of containing disorder, criminality, and other unacceptable
habits of the dangerous classes.
To the extent that social control is a defining aim of the modern state, and
fidelity to the rule of law at best an ideological commitment, this tension tends to
erode the state's adherence to rule of law norms. This is evident in a number of
contexts besides habitual offender laws: in the erosion of protections from
discretionary police searches or other investigations; in the debasement of
POLICE POWER (2000) (on policing and social control); SIDNEY HARRING, POLICING A CLASS
SOCIETY: THE EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN CITIES, 1865-1915 (1983) (on policing and social control);
DARIO MELOSSI & MASSIMO PAVARINI, THE PRISON AND THE FACTORY: ORIGINS OF THE
PENITENTIARY SYSTEM 40-41, 50-51 (1981) (on punishment and social control); Helen Boritch &
John Hagan, Crime and the Changing Forms of Class Control: Policing Public Order in "Toronto
the Good, " 1859-1955, 66 Soc. FORCES 307 (1987) (on policing, criminal process and social
control); Dario Melossi, Gazette of Morality and Social Whip: Punishment, Hegemony and the
Case of the USA, 1970-92, 2 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 259, 262 (1993) (on punishment and social
control). Such a concept of social control has its origins in several classic works, see Douglas Hay,
Property, Authority and the Criminal law, in ALBION'S FATAL TREE 17, 26 (Douglas Hay et al. eds.,
1975); GEORG RUSCHE & OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (2003).
159. Indeed, according to radical proponents of the social control concept, it is by the ostensibly
more neutral medium of articulating class control as threat control and control of the "dangerous
classes" that the more pernicious dimensions of social control are most effectively justified. See
RANDALL G. SHELDEN, CONTROLLING THE DANGEROUS CLASSES: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE
HISTORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2000) (introduction to this concept). See also STEVEN Box,
RECESSION, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1987); HARRING, POLICING A CLASS SOCIETY, supra note 158;
Dario Melossi, Changing Representations of the Criminal, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 296, 298-99
(2000); Theodore G. Chiricos & Miriam A. DeLone, Labor Surplus and Punishment: A Review and
Assessment of Theory and Evidence, 39 SOC. PROBLEMS 421, 422-26 (1992).
160. This is not to say that the rule of law is antithetical to social control. As our earlier
discussion anticipates, rule of law norms may sometimes serve to rationalize and obscure the
criminal law's social control functions. This notion is captured by the radical historian, E.P.
Thompson, who writes, "The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law, in its function as
ideology, is that it shall display an independence from gross manipulation and shall seem to be
just." THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 263. In general through, rule of law norms tend to frustrate and
are inconvenient to the effective use of the criminal law in this fashion-which explains the




ostensibly operative legal norms by doctrines like "harmless error"; in the
collapse of formal procedures in the context of inadequate legal counsel and
inadequate access to legal process; in the displacement of sovereign functions
onto private actors; and in outright lawlessness on the part of state officials.
161
Any assessment of juridical structure of habitual offender laws and its
authoritarian implications must be undertaken with an awareness of the
significance of these other kinds of affronts to the rule of law.
However, habitual offender laws are especially troublesome representatives of
the impulse toward social control. They do not simply involve the emasculation
of doctrines, like probable cause or the warrant requirement, that indirectly
support the rule of law. Instead, by their very nature, these laws subvert the basic
conceptual foundations of the rule of law and the principles that spring out of its
central norms-specifically, the prohibition of double jeopardy, retroactivity, and
status crimes. This juridical posture accompanies the tendency of habitual
offender laws to qualitatively expand sovereignty beyond any "normal"
confinement by the rule of law, to criminalize criminality itself and, in the end, to
make sentencing harsher. Instead of a prospective, formally constituted concern
to deter and punish particular acts, the power of the state is simultaneously
released by these laws from any requirement of prospectivity and redirected at
the punishment of particular types: 'dirtbags,' 'career criminals,'
'incorrigibles'-whatever they might be called.
The practical consequences of this notion of criminal liability are even more
troubling. Significantly, the enhancement of punishment that follows from this
juridical logic does not fall on an abstract class of deviant people. Rather, it is
overwhelmingly concentrated on those people who exist at the intersection of
economic deprivation and racial exclusion-the so-called "underclass."' 162 For
these "rejects of market society,, 163 arrest and criminal conviction are not only
much more likely than for more socially secure groups, 64 these experiences are
161. See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 18; WALKER, supra note 36; Ahmed A. White, Rule of Law
and the Limits of Sovereignty: The Private Prison in Jurisprudential Perspective, 38 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 111 (2001); Ahmed A. White, Victims' Rights, Rule of Law, and the Threat to Liberal
Jurisprudence, 87 KY. L.J. 357 (1999).
162. Loic Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh, 3
PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y 95, 99 (2001), available at http://sociology.berkeley.edu/faculty/wacquant/
wacquantpdf/DEADLYSYMBPRISGHETTO.pdf.
163. See id. at 98.
164. The overwhelming majority of prison inmates earned poverty or near poverty wages prior
to incarceration. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., SURVEY OF STATE PRISON INMATES
1991, at 3 (1993), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sospi91.pdf. Most were also
either unemployed or underemployed. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., PROFILE OF
JAIL INMATES 1996, at 3-4 (rev. 1998), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pji96.pdf.
See also Andrew Karmen, Property, Crime, and Criminal Justice, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25, 27 (William C.
Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000) (revealing very high rates of unemployment and indigence
among New York jail inmates). The overwhelming majority of criminal defendants rely on
indigent defense services. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
CRIMINAL CASES 1, 5 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf. Most
prison inmates have not completed high school. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.,
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facts of life. 165 For many denizens of the underclass, criminality is a rational,
relatively normal response to the social conditions in which these people are
mired. 16Z Empirically, these are the incorrigibles, the "career criminals," the
supposedly morally depraved on whom habitual offender laws so
sanctimoniously impose a higher order of deterrence, a greater degree of moral
sanction, or an ultimate sanction of lifetime incapacitation. 67 In other words, the
status on which habitual offender laws focus is as much the social status of
economic and racial marginalization as it is a measure of individual depravity.
The criminalization of criminality is an exercise in asserting more strongly the
general, if not indelible, criminality of the poor and the socially oppressed. If
being socially marginalized has always come with a preordination of criminality,
habitual offender laws extend and formalize that condition, making past indicia
of criminality like prior convictions iron clad bases of future punishment. It is in
this connection that the tendency of these laws to frequently impose enormous
sentences for the most trivial crimes of property and public order (which is so
aptly emphasized by critics of these laws) shows its true logic.
Such pernicious functions of habitual offender laws are not really denied by
these laws' supporters, either judicially or politically. Instead, the constant focus
on incorrigibility, career criminality, and the like actually serves as a veiled
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1997, at 48 tbl. 4.1 (2000), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpus9704.pdf. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE:
RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN
NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1996) (regarding the complex intersection
of class and race in the criminal justice system).
165. For example, at current incarceration rates, over 30% of black males and over 15% of
Hispanic males are likely to be incarcerated during their lifetime. These incredibly high
percentages do not expose socio-economic and geographical effects, which concentrate these risks
in lower income, urban areas. See BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., PREVALENCE OF
IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974-2001, at 8 (2003), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/piuspOl.pdf; BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.,
LIFETIME LIKELIHOOD OF GOING TO STATE OR FEDERAL PRISON 1 (1997), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/llgsfp.pdf. Over 20% of black males age 25 to 44 have
already been incarcerated in state or federal prison. LIFETIME LIKELIHOOD OF GOING TO STATE OR
FEDERAL PRISON, supra, at 6. On contacts between police and young, male racial minorities, see,
e.g., Nicholas R. Fyfe, Policing the City, 32 URB. STUD. 759 (1995). Cf JEROME MILLER, SEARCH
AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1997).
166. See JAY MACLEOD, AIN'T No MAKING IT: ASPIRATIONS AND ATTAINMENT IN A Low-
INCOME NEIGHBORHOOD 31-33, 177-79 (1987); JOHN M. HAGEDORN, PEOPLE AND FOLKS: GANGS,
CRIME, AND THE UNDERCLASS IN A RUST-BELT CITY 187-92 (1988); Stephen W. Baron, Street Youth
Labour Market Experiences and Crime, 38 CAN. REV. OF SoC. ANTHROPOLOGY 189 (2001). See
also WILLIAM J. WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1997).
167. According to Washington State's review of its own sentencing practices, blacks are six
times more likely to be sentenced under the state three strikes law than Native Americans, the
closest ethnic group, and are more than eighteen times more likely than whites to receive such a
sentence. For the state's two strike sentences, the disparity is even greater. NELLA LEE & EDWARD
M VUKICH, WASH. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, REPRESENTATION AND EQUALITY IN
WASHINGTON STATE: AN ASSESSMENT OF DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPARITY IN ADULT FELONY
SENTENCING-FISCAL YEAR 2000, at 75-84 (2001). See also WASH. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
COMM'N, DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPARITY IN ADULT FELONY SENTENCING 2003, at 31-34
(2003).
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confession of the ineradicable link between the abstract concept of punishing the
habitual offender and the reality of increasing the punishment of a definite social
stratum. Even without benefit of empirical study, only someone oblivious to the
demographic realities of criminal justice could fail to appreciate the factual
conditions that translate the former, abstract concepts of individual culpability
into the latter reality of group criminalization and group repression.
In this tendency to punish criminality, and by proxy to enhance the criminal
justice system's grip on the socially marginalized, the contemporary fascination
with habitual offender laws may be viewed as an important component of a
larger trend in social policy. For critical scholars of criminal justice, including
David Garland and Loic Wacquant, the criminal justice system's inflationary
expansion over the last several decades follows from a broader policy shift from
relatively "soft," welfarist approaches to dealing with social marginality to
increasingly punitive, criminal justice-based approaches to social control. 68
According to Wacquant, this change in policy reflects both the political economy
of neo-liberalism and, in particular, its hostility to the welfare state, as well as the
tendency of neo-liberal policies to cultivate marginality and with this the
criminality and disorder, both threatened and real, to which the criminal justice
system is called on to respond. 169 For scholars in this vein, this shift in the logic
of social control explains the enormous increases in prison and jail populations
over the last thirty years or so, as well as qualitatively harsher punishment and
the intensification of policing and prosecution.
70
With their effect on the lower classes and their judicially-authorized
indifference to rule of law norms, habitual offender laws may be viewed as an
expression of this trend in the dynamics of social control. They also may be
viewed as a means of sending a clear message to the poor and unemployed that
even a handful of otherwise unrelated petty thefts and relatively minor assaults,
let alone a combination of more serious crimes, will be treated in a manner
normally reserved for murders. This is a message whose effects, drawing on the
symbolism of punishment, reaches well beyond those actually prosecuted. In
other words, there can be no stronger affirmation of the sanctity of property and
168. See LoYc J.D. Wacquant, The Rise of Advanced Marginality: Notes on Its Nature and
Implications, 39 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 121, 130 (2001).
169. See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); Wacquant, The Rise of Advanced Marginality, supra note 168, at
121; LoYc Wacquant, Urban Marginality in the Coming Millennium, 36 URB. STUD. 1639, 1643
(1999). Cf Loic Wacquant, The Penalization of Poverty and the Rise of Neo-Liberalism, 9 EUR. J.
ON CRIM. POL'Y & REs. 401 (2001). On the demise of the social welfare system which has attended
this development, see, e.g., Tony Platt, The State of Welfare: United States 2003, 55 MONTHLY
REV. 13 (2003); Marcia Bok & Louise Simmons, Post- Welfare Reform, Low Income Families, and
the Dissolution of the Social Safety Net, 23 J. FAM. & ECON. IssuEs 217, 220-21 (2002); Karen A.
Curtis, Financial Penalties Under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program: Policy
Discourse and Strategies for Reform, 23 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUEs 239 (2002).
170. See, e.g., Katherine Beckett & Bruce Western, Governing Social Marginality: Welfare,
Incarceration, and the Transformation of State Policy, 3 PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y 43, 44 (2001);
Bruce Western & Katherine Beckett, How Unregulated in the U.S. Labor Market? The Penal
System as a Labor Market Institution, 104 AM. J. Soc. 1030 (1999).
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the inviolable virtues of social order than for the state to demonstrate its
willingness to incarcerate someone for forty years, or even life, for stealing a few
dollars worth of chickens, golf clubs, or pizza.'
1 71
A similar point about the practical social functions of habitual offender laws
and the implications of their accompanying jurisprudence should be noted.
Criminologists have long drawn on the concept of "lesser eligibility" to capture
the logic by which the effectiveness of punishment depends on its ability to
present to those on the margins of society consequences that are worse than their
typical condition in society. Otherwise, the argument goes, crime would be more
attractive than accepting one's deprived condition, and social order would suffer.
Dario Melossi, who invokes a radical perspective, has integrated this concept into
his critique of social control under the criminal law. 172 Melossi derives from the
concept of lesser eligibility the view that the overarching function of the criminal
justice system consists of ensuring not just fidelity to the criminal law, but
compliance with the dominant norms of capitalism: order, hierarchy, discipline,
property, and so forth. For Melossi, the logic of lesser eligibility captures the
link between criminal punishment and social control. Moreover, Melossi regards
this relationship as a dynamic one by which the very boundaries of punishment
change in response to changing demands for lower class acquiescence amidst the
changing conditions of modem day existence. 1
73
While Melossi does not speak directly to the way notions of culpability
themselves might change as part of this dynamic-his discussion proceeds on a
largely abstract level-his insight is relevant both to this question and to the
meaning of the habitual offender issue. Armed with Melossi's insight, it is
possible to see habitual offender laws as a device to elevate the costs of non-
compliance for people whose debasement amidst the ruins of the welfare state
has left them with little to lose, and to see its jurisprudence, freed of conventional
notions about the limits of culpability, as a means of abetting this mode of
expanding the legal boundaries of social control.
V. CONCLUSION
The tendency of habitual offender laws to metastasize the justice system's
social control functions gives great credence to Neumann's broader point about
the rule of law's tenuous existence, even under capitalism. While social control
is inherent in all societies, and while overtly authoritarian regimes, whether
fascist or (ostensibly) communist have made extensive use of the criminal law for
social control purposes, proponents of liberal capitalism, like Hayek, have always
claimed that the rule of law is more secure under capitalism. As Neumann
perceived, the problem with this view is that capitalism itself is saddled with
tendencies toward social conflict that make the realization of the rule of law
171. See generally Melossi, supra note 158.
172. See generally Ahmed A. White, Capitalism, Social Marginality, and the Rule of Laws
Uncertain Fate in Modern Society, 37 ARiz. ST. L.J. 759, 795 (2005).
173. Melossi, supra note 158, at 262-63.
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problematic. It is the very essence of capitalism to generate these conflicts. In
the case of habitual offender laws, we see how even in liberal society, the
impetus to assert social control over these dynamics can culminate in the most
abject violation of the rule of law and raise the specter of authoritarianism.
Habitual offender laws are not the only relevant example of this tendency.
This article has discussed other areas of erosion of rule of law norms in the
criminal justice context, and the retreat of restraints on arrest powers, searches,
and other aspects of policing. Also, habitual offender laws themselves share a
basic logic with other, typically more complicated sentencing regimes that also
rely on evidence of past criminality to "enhance punishment," for example,
traditional indeterminate sentencing as well as the more modem practice of
"guideline" sentencing. In the light of the present critique, the best that can be
said of these regimes is that their affronts to the rule of law and the juridical
implications that follow are perhaps not as blatant as with habitual offender laws.
Neumann also cautioned that the rule of law's demise was in some sense
inherently tied to the rise of authoritarianism. 174 There is no reason to deny the
force of that notion in this case. While habitual offender laws hardly presage the
rise of an authoritarian state, let alone anything like the Nazi regime and its
affronts to human dignity, the authoritarian tendencies of these laws are still
evident, if only in a milder and more circumscribed form. With habitual offender
laws the authoritarian impact is more localized, demographically and spatially,
and no doubt precisely for that very reason, beyond the purview of most critics.
Here, again, is the pernicious beauty of these laws: they impose their suspect
juridical implications on a politically weak population.
In the end, the rule of law may function critically in revealing these conditions.
However, the rule of law cannot rectify its own disavowal in law and policy. The
law itself-meaning legal doctrines, like the Double Jeopardy Clause, cast
against these laws-cannot do that. Nor would it make sense simply to appeal to
the legislatures or the courts to set things right. Significantly, these are the very
institutions that first created and then justified these regimes, and they have done
this now for most all of this country's history. While these institutions are quite
responsive to political and economic pressures-that assumption is embedded in
the very idea of social control under the criminal law-there is little reason to
think that the kinds of appeal that have repeatedly failed in the past will suddenly
gain traction. What can be done is to expose these statutes for what they are, to
reveal in them the latent dangers of authoritarianism, and hope that this informs
the kind of political struggle that alone has ever steered a society away from such
a course.
174. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society, supra note 17, at 127-
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